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#### The upsurge of Anti-Muslim rhetoric has turned the political sphere into an echo chamber of racism, sacrificing any remaining semblance of critical thought on the altar of bipartisanship.

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[Henry A. Giroux, Global TV Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, formerly Boston University, Miami University, Penn State University, "Breivik's Fundamentalist War on Politics, and Ours," August 3, <http://www.truth-out.org/breiviks-fundamentalist-war-politics-and-ours/1312390288>]

The tragic slayings in Norway raise anew serious questions about domestic terrorism and its roots in right-wing ideology and fundamentalist movements. Breivik's manifesto "2083" and his murderous actions remind us of the degree to which right-wing extremism is more than a minor threat to American security - a fact we have been all too often willing to forget. The foundation of such violence, and the insistent threat it poses to democracy, is not to be found in its most excessive and brutal acts, but in the absolutist worldview that produces it. As the Swedish religion scholar Mattias Gardell insists, "The terrorist attacks in Oslo were not an outburst of irrational madness, but a calculated act of political violence. The carnage was a manifestation of a certain logic that can and should be explained, if we want to avoid a repetition."[5] Elements of such a logic are not only on full display in American society, but are also gaining ground. The influence of extremist and fundamentalist ideologies and worldviews - whether embodied in religion, politics, militarism or the market - can be seen currently in the rhetoric at work at the highest levels of government. How else to explain that just one day after the deficit settlement in Washington, Republican Congressman Doug Lamborn of Colorado Springs, in an interview with a Denver radio station, referred to President Obama as a "tar baby."[6] It is hard to mistake the racist nature of the use of the term "tar baby," given its long association as a derogatory term for African-Americans. Soon afterward, Pat Buchanan wrote a column that began with a shockingly overt racist comment in which he writes: "Mocked by The Wall Street Journal and Sen. John McCain as the little people of the Harry Potter books, the Tea Party 'Hobbits' are indeed returning to Middle Earth - to nail the coonskin to the wall."[7] What is clear about this type of racist discourse is that it creates a climate where hatred and violence become legitimate options. It also indicates that the violence of extremist rhetoric is alive and well in American politics; yet, it is barely noticed, and produces almost no public outrage. Moreover, this type of fundamentalism and extremism is about more than just the rise of the Tea Party. It is a growing and ominous force in everyday life, politics, and in the media. A rigid, warlike mentality has created an atmosphere in which dialogue is viewed as a weakness and compromise understood as personal failing. As Richard Hofstadter argued over 50 years ago, fundamentalist thinking is predicated on an anti-intellectualism and the refusal to engage other points of view.[8] The other is not confronted as someone worthy of respect, but as an enemy, someone who constitutes a threat, who must be utterly vanquished. Michel Foucault goes further and insists that fundamentalists do not confront the other as: a partner in the search for the truth but an adversary, an enemy who is wrong, who is harmful, and whose very existence constitutes a threat.... There is something even more serious here: in this comedy, one mimics war, battles, annihilations, or unconditional surrenders, putting forward as much of one's killer instinct as possible.[9] Missing from the fundamentalist toolbox is the necessity for self-reflection, thinking critically about the inevitable limitations of one's arguments, or being morally accountable to the social costs of harboring racist ideologies and pushing policies that serve to deepen racist exclusions, mobilize fear, and legitimate a growing government apparatus of punishment and imprisonment.[10] What connects the moral bankruptcy of right-wing Republicans who embrace violent imagery in order to mobilize their followers with the mindset of extremists like Breivik is that they share a deep romanticization of violence that is valorized by old and new fundamentalisms, whose endpoint is a death-dealing blow to the welfare state, young people, immigrants, Muslims, and others deemed dangerous and, so, "disposable." It is not surprising that Breivik's radical anti-Islamic views draw repeatedly on the work of a number of American extremists, including Andrew Bostrom, David Horowitz and Daniel Pipes. In contrast to comforting media illusions, we are not talking about the emergence of right-wing lone wolfs who explode in a frenzy of hate and violence, but an increasing pervasive - though not yet dominant - fundamentalist worldview that embraces a circle of certainty, evokes a Manichean struggle between good and evil, espouses an anti-intellectual populism, calls for the banishing of critical intellectuals from the academy, and rails against critical academic fields such as postcolonial studies, feminist studies, peace studies and ethnic studies. And while many of these religious and secular fundamentalists may not argue directly for real violence, they spew out a steady stream of hatred that created the conditions for such violence. I am not suggesting that Breivik's actions can be linked directly to right-wing extremism in the Congress and broader society, but it is not altogether unjust to suggest that what they share are a number of core concerns, including a view of immigrants as a threat to American nationalism, an embrace of anti-Muslim rhetoric, a strong espousal of militarism, market fundamentalism, hyper-nationalism and support for a host of retrograde social policies that embrace weakening unions, the rolling back of women's rights, and a deep distrust of equality as a foundation of democracy itself.[11] Chris Hedges outlines the elements of such a fundamentalism when he writes: Fundamentalists have no interest in history, culture or social or linguistic differences.... They are provincials.... They peddle a route to assured collective deliverance. And they sanction violence and the physical extermination of other human beings to get there. All fundamentalists worship the same gods - themselves. They worship the future prospect of their own empowerment. They view this empowerment as a necessity for the advancement and protection of civilization or the Christian state. They sanctify the nation. They hold up the ability the industrial state has handed to them as a group and as individuals to shape the world according to their vision as evidence of their own superiority.... The self-absorbed world view of these fundamentalists brings smiles of indulgence from the corporatists who profit, at our expense, from the obliteration of moral and intellectual inquiry.[12] At work here is a moral and political absolutism that more and more dehumanizes young people, immigrants, feminists, Muslims, and others relegated to the outside of the narrow parameters of a public sphere preserved for white, Christian and male citizens. Breivik acted upon his hatred of Muslims, leftists and immigrants by murdering young people whose activities at a Labor Party Camp suggested they might usher in a future at odds with his deeply racist and authoritarian views. As Scott Shane, writing in The New York Times, put it, and it bears repeating, Breivik, "was deeply influenced by a small group of American bloggers and writers who have warned for years about the threat from Islam."[13] Breivik names, among others, the right-wing extremist Pamela Geller, "who has called President Obama 'President Jihad' and claimed that Arab language classes are a plot to subvert the United States."[14] More recently, Geller's xenophobic blog, Atlas Shrugs, has repeatedly attempted, "to unearth Obama's relationship to Islam [and prove that] Islam is a political ideology [that is] incompatible with democracy."[15] Geller's racist and hate-filled blog implied that Breivik's attack on the Labor youth camp may have been somehow justified because, as she puts it, "the victims would have grown up to become 'future leaders of the party responsible for flooding Norway with Muslims who refuse to assimilate, who commit major violence against Norwegian natives including violent gang rapes, with impunity, and who live on the dole."[16] Atlas vomits! As ThinkProgress' Lee Fang points out, Geller attempts to prove her point by posting a picture taken on the island camp a few hours before Breivik's murderous rampage, and she writes, without any sense of remorse, "Note the faces which are more Mlddle [sic] Easter or mixed than pure Norwegian."[17] While such shocking expressions of racism cannot be directly connected to all forms of fundamentalism, there is nothing in those who espouse this worldview that renders them open or willing to exercise the judgment, critical inquiry, and thoughtfulness necessary to counter and resist such views and the violence to which they often lead. Such worldviews operate on the side of certainty, wrap themselves in a logic that is considered unquestionable, refuse compromise and dialogue, and often invoke a militarized vocabulary to define themselves as soldiers fighting a war for Western civilization. This is a worldview in which ignorance and impotence join with violence, sanctified by a fundamentalism that thrives on conformity and authoritarian populism. Breivik was not a typical right-wing terrorist. He refused to endorse a strategy that made a claim for racial superiority on biological grounds; more specifically, he recognized that it was not wise tactically, "to oppose immigration and Islam on racial grounds (an argument that would attract few people.)"[18] Instead, he admired and adopted an ideology from those far-right groups that revised old racist beliefs and adopted a new anti-Muslim narrative in which immigrants and those deemed other, "are not biologically inferior, but they are culturally incompatible."[19] In this case, cultural difference rather than biological degeneration is viewed as a threat to democracy.[20] While most right-wing politicians, individuals and groups denounce the horrendous violence perpetrated by Breivik, they nonetheless produce and contribute to a culture of violence and rhetoric of demonization that undermines respect for difference, democratic values, and a capacious notion of personal and social responsibility. As recently stated in a study by the Anti-Defamation League: The hateful rhetoric around the immigration debate has gone beyond the rallies, lobbying and media appearances by anti-immigration advocates. A number of media personalities in television and radio, as well as political leaders, have adopted the same language when discussing immigration issues in this country. These extend from [former] "national TV correspondent Lou Dobbs to more extreme political commentator Patrick Buchanan to local radio personalities to members of Congress such as Tom Tancredo and Steve King ... the use of anti-immigrant rhetoric has permeated the culture in our country."[21] There are few degrees of separation between far-right extremists such as the late Madeleine Cosman, an alleged medical lawyer, and radio and TV personality Lou Dobbs, yet both have argued that Mexican immigrants are criminals and carriers of diseases such as leprosy. This type of hysterical xenophobia can also be found in the words and actions of New York Republican Rep. Peter T. King, who, as chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee, has opened hearings on the radicalization of Muslim Americans. This type of racist hysteria (that precludes investigation of other forms of radicalization) is commonplace in America, and is aided and abetted by conservatives such as Buchanan, who writes columns such as "Say goodbye to Los Angeles" filled with apocalyptic visions of the United States being taken over by people of color.[22] This type of rhetoric is easy politics. As such, it is widely used in the United States, and can also be found in the work of the late Harvard scholar Samuel Huntington, [23] anti-Muslim bloggers, Christian fundamentalists, Fox News commentators and in anti-immigration policies initiated in a variety of states, with one of the most pernicious examples introduced by state legislators in Arizona. Fundamentalism is as home grown as the Ku Klux Klan and white militia groups, and can be found across a range of groups extending from the Christian right to secular fundamentalists such as Sam Harris.[24] This type of bigotry and the life-crushing policies it produces can give rise to and spread like a disease; its targets seem to multiply every day in the United States. Indeed, one could argue that the only successful (though hardly cost-effective) war the United States has waged since the 1980's has been against poor men of color, who now represent 70 percent of all inmates in US prisons.[25] Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) populations are indeed another target of hate, captured for example in one of Buchanan's recent columns, in which he writes: "What is the moral basis of the argument that homosexuality is normal, natural and healthy? In recent years, it has been associated with high levels of AIDS and enteric diseases, and from obits in gay newspapers, early death. Where is the successful society where homosexual marriage was normal?"[26] There is also the war on youth, which is now in high gear with the implosion of social safety nets, decent housing, health care and the simultaneous rise of the punishing state, this the result of the conservative takeover of a number of state legislators and governorships by radical conservatives and the control of the House of Representatives by right-wing extremists. This isn't the kind of direct warfare we saw in Norway, but it is warfare just the same, less spectacular in the short run, but with more casualties in the long run. Consider the actions of Jan Brewer, the governor of Arizona, in, "spearheading a bill to eliminate KidsCare, the state's Medicaid Program for children ... though twenty three percent of Arizona's children live in poverty."[27] What does one say about Gov. Paul LePage of Maine, who, "recently signed into law a bill that eases child labor laws, lowering restrictions on the hours and days teenagers can work."[28] It gets worse. Nevada Democratic Sen. Harry Reid signaled the current extremism of the Republican Party by highlighting that the legislation they have recently introduced would cut or eliminate Medicaid and the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP). Over 1.7 million kids would lose health insurance by 2016.[29] Common Dreams reported that, "GOP Florida lawmakers have rejected over $50 million in much-needed federal child-abuse prevention money because it was part of Obama's healthcare reform package."[30] Violence becomes news when its most extreme registers erupt in waves of bloodshed. Yet, there is another kind of violence that can rightfully be viewed as a form of domestic terrorism. It can be seen in an array of statistics that point to the current war on youth: 43.6 millions Americans live in poverty and one child in five is poor; "infant mortality, low birth weight and child deaths under five are ranked higher in the United States as compared to other Western nations and Japan. Among Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, only Mexico, Turkey and the Slovak Republic have higher infant mortality than the U.S."[31] As a result of the corruption and crimes of bankers, Wall Street, and the right-wing politicians who have bailed them out and legitimated the deregulatory policies that produced such hardships, millions of people are unemployed and have lost their homes, all of which impacts not just on adults, but on generations of young people condemned to poverty, homelessness, unemployment and a future without hope. This is the violence legitimated by right-wing conservative policies, which contribute to shocking levels of inequality in which the wealth of Hispanics and blacks fell by 66 percent and 55 percent, respectively, between 2005 and 2009. The United States has the highest inequality and poverty rate among the industrialized nations. Such statistics point to policies that are not simply mean-spirited; they are cruel, sadistic and dishonor the government's obligations to young people and politically marginalized populations. Economist Paul Krugman rightly claims that, "The G.O.P. budget plan isn't a good-faith effort to put America's fiscal house in order; it's voodoo economics, with an extra dose of fantasy, and a large helping of mean-spiritedness."[32] Krugman goes further and argues that the American government is being held hostage by a group of Republican extremists who purposely want to make government dysfunctional. Far-right zealots such a Michele Bachmann and her conservative evangelical compatriots embody a mode of fundamentalism that promotes gay-bashing, a disdain for social protections and a deep hatred of government, which is rooted less in political and economic analyses than in biblical stricture and religious values.[33] Yet, such commitments are not marginal to American politics. For example, Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Kentucky) stated that, "After years of discussions and months of negotiations, I have little question that as long as this president is in the Oval Office, a real solution is unattainable."[34] There is more than a covert racism at work here, given the extremist views about Obama that inform much of the Republican Party, there is also a cult of certainty that has given political extremism a degree of normalcy, while at the same time indicating the degree to which such thought now permeates American society. In fact, absolutist thought is now driving official state and federal policy and pushing an alleged liberal Obama to a far-right position, all in the name of a cowardly appeal to bipartisanship and a deeply flawed notion of consensus. Not only is the power of market-driven casino capitalism at its zenith, but a culture of fundamentalism has become the driving force in American politics that is only a few degrees away from an outright embrace of a 21st century authoritarianism. What is interesting, and quite frightening, about Krugman's analysis of the growing fundamentalism and religiosity of American politics is his insightful claim that such a move is being abetted by a dominant media apparatus that views extremist ideas within what he calls a "cult of balance," in which such views are treated as just one more legitimate opinion. Listen to Brian Williams, the NBC News anchor, on any given night, and you get firsthand one of the worst offenders of the cult of balance. Krugman is worth citing on this issue. He writes: News reports portray the parties as equally intransigent; pundits fantasize about some kind of "centrist" uprising, as if the problem was too much partisanship on both sides. Some of us have long complained about the cult of "balance," the insistence on portraying both parties as equally wrong and equally at fault on any issue, never mind the facts. I joked long ago that if one party declared that the earth was flat, the headlines would read, "Views Differ on Shape of Planet." But would that cult still rule in a situation as stark as the one we now face, in which one party is clearly engaged in blackmail and the other is dickering over the size of the ransom? The answer, it turns out, is yes. And this is no laughing matter: The cult of balance has played an important role in bringing us to the edge of disaster. For when reporting on political disputes always implies that both sides are to blame, there is no penalty for extremism.[35] All of which is to say that there is another side to right-wing fundamentalism that needs to be addressed outside of its xenophobic, homophobic, antigovernment, antifeminist and youth-hating beliefs, which have become increasingly normalized, legitimated and defined loosely as just another view in American society. Yet, this is about more than the rise of a hate-filled fundamentalism and populist anti-intellectualism that scorns debate, dialogue and critical exchange. It is also symptomatic of the end of politics, and, by default, signals the death knell of democracy itself. Politics becomes moribund when dialogue, critical exchange, reasoned arguments, facts, logic and critical modes of education become objects of derision and contempt. Right-wing extremism is nourished when the formative culture that makes democracy possible is defunded, commercialized and diminished - when it is eroded and increasingly ceases to exist. Right-wing extremism and the fundamentalist logic it embraces is not merely a security threat; it does not simply produce terrorists. It actively wages a war on the very possibility of judgment, informed argument and critical agency itself. It opens the door for lies and omissions parading as truth, ignorance celebrated as informed reason and the dismissal of science as just another worthy opinion. In the end, violence emerges as a legitimate strategy to weed out those not on the side of an unquestioning moralism. Education redefined as training, fear driven by political illiteracy and authoritarian populism parading as the will of the people speak to what philosopher Hannah Arendt once called "dark times," to refer to that period in history in which the forces of totalitarianism and fascism extinguished reason, thoughtful exchange, discerning judgments, justice and truth. We are once again in on the brink of "dark times" and the clock is not merely ticking. The alarm is blaring, and yet the American public refuses to wake from a nightmare that is about to become a dreadful and punishing reality. Of course, history is open, and we have witnessed in Egypt, Iran, Syria, Greece and other countries, men, women and young people who have refused the established and beckoning forms of authoritarianism, giving rise to collective revolts that display immense courage and hope. It is past time for Americans to look beyond existing forms of leadership, the tired vocabularies of established political parties, the thoughtless stenography dispersed by mainstream media and the official view of democracy as just another form of consumerism. It is time to look to those struggles abroad that both embrace democracy and embody a form of civic courage in which thinking and morality inform each other in support of a world where young people can flourish, politics becomes a noble practice and democracy has a future.

#### This is evident in status quo detention policy. Indefinite detention represents an attempt to single out, debase and eradicate Muslim culture.

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[Hilal, “Racializing Islam Before and After 9/11: From Melting Pot to Islamophobia”, TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, Vol. 21, Spring 2012, RSR]

The combination of prolonged illegal detention, a new interpretation of ¶ torture, and cruel interrogation practices has led to widespread criticism in ¶ the United States and abroad, both by human rights organizations and by ¶ foreign governments.149 “According to a report by Human Rights First, close ¶ to one hundred people have died in U.S. custody; the Pentagon classifies ¶ thirty-four of those cases as criminal homicides. At least eight of those people ¶ were literally tortured to death.”150 The most shocking treatment was ¶ exposed in photographs from Abu Ghraib that were published in mainstream ¶ media in the United States and worldwide.151 Various human rights ¶ organizations and the Pentagon rushed to investigate the atrocities. The ¶ resulting reports were revealing. Abuses were widespread, not only in Iraq ¶ but in Afghanistan and Guantanamo as well.¶ 152 This incident is considered ¶ something of a game changer in relation to the popularity of the Iraq war. ¶ After Abu Ghraib, much of the American public lost its confidence in military ¶ practices. This was a big turning point against the Bush Administration ¶ among the American political establishment. Right after this incident,¶ Senator McCain and his supporters introduced an anti-torture amendment. ¶ However, despite all these pictures that became disturbing icons of the¶ Bush Administration’s policy in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo, the ¶ general public did not appreciate a deeper problematic aspect of these ¶ practices: “U.S. soldiers and interrogators singled out Islamic culture in their ¶ efforts to humiliate and mistreat prisoners.”153 “The experiences of U.S. ¶ Captain James Yee, a West Point graduate and convert to Islam, offer ¶ compelling evidence of how, throughout the post-9/11 period, antagonism ¶ toward prisoners, and efforts to break them, rested upon the debasement of ¶ Muslim practices and religious items.”154 Another disturbing incident¶ happened in Afghanistan. American soldiers ¶ burned and desecrated the bodies of two Taliban fighters, ¶ publicly placing their corpses “facing west,” in an apparent, deliberate mocking of the Islamic requirement to face Mecca ¶ during prayer. Elsewhere, female soldiers have been used to ¶ humiliate detainees by touching them and by making them ¶ undress . . . and [using] sexually provocative tactics . . . meant ¶ to violate Muslim taboos about contact between the sexes and ¶ religious purity.155¶ Using woman interrogators in such a way is also extremely humiliating ¶ for American female military officers, but again this issue never became a ¶ public concern as subordination and humiliation and dehumanization of ¶ women in the military. To draw a fine line between the war on terror and a ¶ war on Islam obviously was not one of the concerns of the American military. ¶ Moreover, these tactics have been used to dehumanize detainees, using their ¶ belief as a weapon against them.156 In Iraq, the attitudes of American ¶ soldiers to the Iraqi people provide abundant evidence that racial ¶ subordination of the Iraqi people was common knowledge.

#### Our detention policy is founded upon the basis of racial profiling. It creates a perpetual security state that dehumanizes the Brown Other.

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[Judith, “INDEFINITE DETENTION”, La Rivista del Manifesto, Numero 35, 2003, RSR]

The license to brand and categorize and detain on the basis of suspicion alone, expressed in this operation of “deeming,” is potentially enormous. We have already seen it at work in racial profiling, in the detention of hundreds of Arab residents or Arab-American citizens, sometimes on the basis of last names alone; the attacks on individuals of Middle-East descent on U.S. streets, and the targeting of Arab-American professors on campuses. Indeed, when Rumsfeld has sent the U.S. into periodic panics or “alerts,” he has not told the population what to look out for, but only to have a heightened awareness of suspicious activity. This objectless panic translates too quickly into suspicion of all dark skinned peoples, especially those who are Arab, or appear to look so to a population not always well-versed in making visual distinctions, say, between Sikhs and Muslims or, indeed, Sephardic or Arab Jews and Pakistani-Americans.. Although “deeming” someone dangerous is considered a state prerogative in these discussions, it is also a potential license for prejudicial perception and a virtual mandate to heighten racialized ways of looking and judging, that is, prejudicial forms of suspicion in the name of national security. A population of Islamic peoples, or those taken to be Islamic, becomes targeted by this government mandate to be on heightened alert, with the effect that the Arab population in the U.S. becomes visually rounded up, stared down, watched, hounded and monitored by a group of citizens who understand themselves as foot soldiers in the war against terrorism. What kind of public culture is being created when a certain “indefinite containment” takes place outside the prison walls, on the subway, in the airplanes, on the street, on the workplace. A falafel restaurant run by Lebanese Christians that does not exhibit the American flag becomes immediately suspect, as if the failure to fly the flag becomes read as a sign of sympathy with Al-Qaeda, a deduction that has no justification, but which nevertheless rules public culture - and business interests - at this time. If it is the person, or the people, who are deemed dangerous, and no dangerous acts need to be shown or proven to anyone to establish this as true, then the state constitutes the detained population unilaterally, taking them out of the jurisdiction of the law, depriving them of the legal protections to which subjects under national and international law are entitled. These are surely populations that are not subjects, humans who are not conceptualized within the frame of a political culture in which human lives are underwritten by legal entitlements, law, and so humans who are not humans. We saw evidence for this derealization of the human in the photos released by the Department of Defense of the shackled bodies in Guantanamo.

#### Debate reinforces this by privileging seeking truth through rational forms of deliberation divorced from social conditions. This props up the centralized, secular state, which discriminates against followers of so-called “irrational religions” in the name of stability. Even institutional appeals to religious tolerance are used to demobilize opposition and preserve the state’s power.

Asad 93 (Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam, Johns Hopkins University Press - A (1993), http://100.markelmore.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2013/05/01\_asad\_Genealogies-of-Religion\_-all.pdf, da 11-15-13) PC

The rationality of criticism, according to Kant, consists in the fact that the statuses and passions of those involved have nothing to do¶ with judging the truth of an argument. The validity of any judgment requires that one abstract oneself from all empirical interests. Yet,¶ significantly, the idea that arrival at the truth depends on public argument, on free and open examination that is independent of social¶ conditions, does not always appear to prevail with the Enlightenment thinker. In an unpublished justification of his promise to the king not to¶ write again on religious matters, Kant noted: “Repudiation and denial of one’s inner conviction are evil, but silence in a case like the present¶ one is the duty of a subject; and while all that one says must be true, this does not mean that it is one’s duty to speak out the whole truth in¶ public” (cited in Reiss 1991, 2). In this case, it seems, (religious) truth stands independently of public argument because it has been translated¶ as belief (which, unlike knowledge, is based on personal experience), and public expressions of personal belief (although not the belief itself)¶ must always defer to that public authority which is known as the state. For belief in the final analysis is not “objective knowledge” (science),¶ it is merely “opinion.” Thus, no damage is done to truth if opinion is denied free play in public.¶ This position was in keeping with Kant’s Pietist upbringing, which, according to Cassirer, gave its adherents “that calm, that¶ cheerfulness, that inner peace that is disturbed by no passion” (cited in Gay 1973, 328). “As a consequence [writes a historian of the¶ Enlightenment] even Kant—who repudiated all but the most abstract religion, who condemned enthusiasm and refused to engage in any¶ religious observance —even Kant himself paid Pietism the unconscious tribute of incorporating some of its teachings into his work: ... its¶ conviction that religion depends not on dogma or ritual or prayer but on experience” (Gay 1973, 28-29). Of course, Pietism was not the¶ major form of Protestant religion, either then or in succeeding centuries. But the apolitical, noninstitutional character of early German Pietism¶ was not exceptional in the development of eighteenth-century European religiosity.¶ 151¶ Historians of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe have begun to recount how the constitution of the modern state required the¶ forcible redefinition of religion as belief, and of religious belief, sentiment, and identity as personal matters that belong to the newly emerging¶ space of private (as opposed to public) life. In the eyes of those who wanted a strong, centralized state, the disorders of the Reformation¶ proved that religious belief was the source of uncontrollable passions within the individual and of dangerous strife within the commonwealth.¶ It could not, for this reason, provide an institutional basis for a common morality—still less a public language of rational criticism. More¶ aggressively, Hobbes contended that institutionalized religion—but not the prince—was a vested interest, and that consequently it had to be¶ subordinated to the monarch.¶ 152¶ In this way, Hobbes postulated the unity and sovereignty of the modern state.¶ Scholars are now more aware that religious toleration was a political means to the formation of strong state power that emerged from the¶ sectarian wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries rather than the gift of a benign intention to defend pluralism. As contemporaries¶ recognized, the locus of intolerance had shifted. “L‘heresie n’est plus auiourd‘huy en la Religion,” insisted a French jurist of the period, “elle¶ est en l’Estat” (cited in Koselleck 1985, 8).¶ According to Lipsius (Oestreich 1982), the influential religious skeptic writing at the end of the sixteenth century, the prince should follow¶ any policy that would secure civil peace regardless of moral or legal scruples. If religious diversity could be forcibly eliminated, so much the¶ better, Lipsius urged; if that was impossible, then religious toleration should be enforced by the state. ¶ 153¶ Locke’s famous argument for¶ religious toleration a century later was similarly motivated by a concern for the integrity and power of the state: it was because he considered¶ the beliefs of Catholics and atheists dangerous to civil peace that he thought they should not be tolerated by the state (Mendus 1989, 22-43).¶ Not only were religious beliefs now constitutionally subordinated to the state, but the principles of morality were henceforth to be¶ theorized separately from the domain of politics.¶ 154¶ In practice, of course, things were always more complicated. Some historians have even¶ argued that the Enlightenment broke precisely on this point with absolutism and initiated a new tradition. Thus, according to Koselleck¶ (1988), the philosophes (including Kant) helped to push the demands of a transcendent secular moralism into the domain of political practice.¶ 155¶ By the time we get to Kant, one can see how a private religion of sentimental sociability was beginning to take the place of a public¶ religion of passionate conviction. It has become a commonplace among historians of modern Europe to say that religion was gradually¶ compelled to concede the domain of public power to the constitutional state, and of public truth to natural science.¶ 156¶ But perhaps it is also¶ possible to suggest that in this movement we have the construction of religion as a new historical object: anchored in personal experience,¶ expressible as belief-statements, dependent on private institutions, and practiced in one’s spare time.¶ 157¶ This construction of religion ensures¶ that it is part of what is inessential to our common politics, economy, science, and morality. More strongly put: religion is what actually or¶ potentially divides us, and if followed with passionate conviction, may set us intolerantly against one another.¶ Of course, the concepts and practices of religion and state have not remained unchanged since Kant. But liberals continue to invoke his¶ principle of the public use of reason as the arbiter of true knowledge (even when they do not accept all his philosophical doctrines) and¶ remain alert to the disruptive possibilities of religion as defined—for Christian as well as non-Christian traditions—by the Enlightenment.¶ The formation of strong state power in the contemporary Middle East has a very different genealogy. In most cases, strong states have¶ inherited colonial forms; a few owe their formation to Islamic movements. In such polities, there is no public use of reason in Kant’s sense,¶ nor are religious truth and religious criticism typically regarded by their public spokesmen as matters properly confined to the personal¶ domain. This is not to say that non-Enlightenment societies do not know what reasoned criticism is, or that nonliberal governments can never¶ permit the public expression of political dissent. On the contrary: institutionalized forms of criticism, made accessible to anonymous readers¶ and listeners, are integral to many non-Enlightenment states. Among them is contemporary Saudi Arabia.

#### Specifically, debate’s focus on policy action is a manifestation of epistemic racism that reasserts the superiority of Western institutions and norms over Islamic thought and recreates the racial profiling responsible for detention

Grosfoguel 10 (Ramón Grosfoguel, Epistemic Islamophobia and Colonial Social Sciences, Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self- Knowledge: Vol. 8: Iss. 2, Article 5, 2010, http://scholarworks.umb.edu/humanarchitecture/vol8/iss2/5, da 11-15-13) PC

The importance of this discussion about epistemic Islamophobia is that the latter is manifested in contemporary debates and public policy. The epistemic racism and its derivative Eurocentric fundamentalism in social theory are manifested in discussions about human rights and democracy today. “Non-Western” epistemologies that define human rights and human dignity in different terms than the West are considered inferior to “West- ern” hegemonic definitions and, thus, excluded from the global conversation about these questions. If Islamic philosophy and thought are portrayed as inferior to the West by Eurocentric thinkers and classical social theory, then the logical con- sequence is that they have nothing to con- tribute to the question of democracy and human rights and should be not only excluded from the global conversation, but repressed. The underlying Western-centric view is that Muslims can be part of the discussion as long as they stop thinking as Muslims and take the hegemonic Eurocentric liberal definition of democracy and human rights. Any Muslim that attempts to think these questions from within the Islamic tradition is immediately suspicious of fundamentalism. Islam and democracy or Islam and Human Rights are considered in the hegemonic Eurocentric “common sense” an oxymoron.¶ The incompatibility between Islam and democracy has as its foundation the epistemic inferiorization of the Muslim world views. Today an artillery of epistemic racist “experts” in the West talks with authority about Islam, with no serious knowledge of the Islamic tradition. The ste- reotypes and lies repeated over and over again in Western press and magazines ends up, like in Goebbels’ Nazi theory of propa- ganda, being believed as truth. As Edward Said said not too long time ago:¶ A corps of experts on the Islamic world has grown to prominence, and during a crisis they are brought out to pontificate on formulaic ideas about Islam on news pro- grams or talk shows. There also seems to have been a strange revival of canonical, though previ- ously discredited, Orientalist ideas about Muslim, generally non- white, people—ideas which have achieved a startling prominence at a time when racial or religious mis- representations of every other cul- tural group are no longer circulated with such impunity. Malicious generalizations about Islam have become the last acceptable form of denigration of foreign culture in the West; what is said about Muslim mind, or character, or religion, or culture as a whole cannot now be said in mainstream discussion about Africans, Jews, other Orien- tals, or Asians.... My contention... is that most of this is unacceptable generalization of the most irrespon- sible sort, and could never be used for any other religious, cultural, or demographic group on earth. What we expect from the serious study of Western societies, with its complex theories, enormously variegated analyses of social structures, histo- ries, cultural formations, and sophisticated languages of investi- gation, we should also expect from the study and discussion of Islamic societies in the West. (Said 1998: xi- xvi)¶ The circulation of these stereotypes contributes to the portrayal of Muslims as racially inferior, violent creatures—thus, its easy association with “terrorism” and representation as “terrorist.”

#### Western epistemology relies on the Cartesian construction of a subject who views arguments from the point-zero perspective, separating their truth-claims from their point of view – this roots knowledge production in the perspective of the Western conqueror, which causes the Islamic Other to be framed as inferior and makes racist policies inevitable.

Grosfoguel and Mielants 6 (Ramón Grosfoguel, University of California - Berkeley, and Eric Mielants, Fairfield University, The Long-Durée Entanglement Between Islamophobia and Racism in the Modern/Colonial Capitalist/Patriarchal World-System: An Introduction, Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge: Vol. 5:Iss. 1, Article 2., 23 September 2006, http://scholarworks.umb.edu/humanarchitecture/vol5/iss1/2, da 10-12-13) PC

Occidentalism created the epistemic privilege and hegemonic identity politics of the West from which to judge and produce knowledge about the “Others.” The ego- politics of knowledge of Rene Descartes in the 17th century where Western men replace God as the foundation of knowledge is the foundational basis of modern Western philosophy. However as Enrique Dussel (1994), Latin American philosopher of liberation, reminds us, Descartes’ ego-cogito (“I think, therefore I am”) was preceded by 150 years of the ego-conquirus (“I conquer, therefore I am”). The God-eye view defended by Descartes transferred the attributes of the Christian God to Western men (the gender here is not accidental). But this was only possible from an Imperial Being, that is, from the panoptic gaze of someone who is at the center of the world because he has conquered it.¶ The myth about Western males’ capacity to produce a knowledge that is universal beyond time and space was fundamental to imperial/global designs. The Cartesian ego-politics of knowledge inaugurated what Colombian philosopher Santiago Castro-Gomez called the “point zero” perspective. The “point zero” perspective is the Western¶ myth of a point of view that assumes itself to be beyond a point of view. This myth allowed Western men to claim their knowledge to be universal, neutral, value-free and objective. Contemporary authors like Sam- uel Huntington (1996) reproduce a combination of old Occidentalism with Orientalism. The superiority of the West is taken for granted and the epistemic privilege of Western identity politics from which to produce judgments of the “Other” and global/imperial designs around the world is an unquestioned presupposition. Moreover, in a male dominated academic culture such as Harvard, a scholar and national defense apolo- gist such as Huntington (2004) specifically links geopolitical concerns and security threats to ‘internal’ American identity issues, most notably coming from those impoverished immigrants who may have the audacity to challenge Western male privilege, socioeconomically, politically and ulti- mately epistemologically (Etzioni 2005).¶ What is the relevance of this epistemic discussion to Islamophobia? It is from Western hegemonic identity politics and epistemic privilege that the ‘rest’ of the epistemologies and cosmologies in the world are subalternized as myth, religion and folklore, and that the downgrading of any form of non-Western knowledge occurs. The former leads to epistemic racism, that is, the inferiorization and subalternization of non-Western knowledge, while the latter leads to Orientalism. It is also from this hegemonic epistemic location that Western thinkers produce Orientalism about Islam. The sub-alternization and inferiorization of Islam were not merely a downgrading of Islam as spirituality, but also as an epistemology.¶ Islamic critical thinkers are considered inferior to the Western/Christian thinkers. The superiority of Western epistemology allows the West to construct with authority the Islamic “Other” as an inferior people or culture frozen in time, and leads Western scholars to write entire books about what went wrong with Islam (e.g. Lewis 2002), as if problems in the Middle East or poverty in regions inhabited by Muslims can somehow be understood by exclusively scrutinizing their religion or their region, effectively turning the ‘Islamic World’ into its own unit of analysis.3 Epistemic racism leads to the Orientalization of Islam. This is crucial because Islamophobia as a form of racism is not exclusively a social phenomenon but also an epistemic question. Epistemic racism allows the West to not have to listen to the critical thinking produced by Islamic thinkers on Western global/imperial designs. The thinking coming from non-Western locations is not considered worthy of attention except to represent it as “uncivilized,” “primitive,” “barbarian,” and “backward.” Epistemic racism allows the West to unilaterally decide what is best for Muslim people today and obstruct any possibility for a serious inter-cultural dialogue. Islamophobia as a form of racism against Muslim people is not only manifested in the labor market, education, public sphere, global war against terrorism, or the global economy, but also in the epistemological battleground about the definition of the priorities of the world today.¶ Recent events such as the September 11 attacks on American soil, the riots in Parisian “banlieues,” anti-immigrant xenophobia, the demonstrations against Danish cartoons of the Prophet, the bombing of London metro stations, the triumph of Hamas in the Palestinian elections, the resistance of Hezbollah to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the bombing of Spanish suburban trains (3/11), and the nuclear energy conflict with Iran, have been all encoded in Islamophobic language in the Western public sphere. Western politicians (with some ex- ceptions such as Rodriguez Zapatero in Spain) and the mainstream media have been complicit if not active participants of Islamophobic reactions to the outlined events.¶ Epistemic racism as the most invisible form of racism, contributes to legitimate an artillery of experts, advisers, specialists, officials, academics and theologians that keep talking with authority about Islam and Muslim people despite their absolute ignorance of the topic and their Islamophobic prejudices. This artillery of intellectuals producing Orientalist knowledge about the inferiority of Islam and its people has been going on since the 18th century (Said 1979) and they contribute to the Western arrogant dismissal of Islamic thinkers.

#### This causes Islamic threat construction in debates about Presidential War Powers, which creates a self-fulfilling prophecy – historically discourse about Islam being incompatible with Western values was coopted to establish authoritarian regimes in Saudi Arabia and deployed by Orientalists to justify the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Bottici and Challand 6 (Chiara Bottici, University of Florence, and Benoît Challand, European University Institute, Rethinking Political Myth: The Clash of Civilizations as a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 2006, European Journal of Social Theory 9(3): 315–336) PC

As Talal Asad also observed (2003), the construction of an Islamic threat, which began long before 9/11 and even Huntington’s book, is precisely the result of the application of modern Western categories and as such it becomes impossible to disentangle the two processes. For instance, Asad emphasizes that the zealotry so characteristic of many Islamic political movements in recent times as well as their ideal of an Islamic state, in which no distinction operates between state and religion, is not a product of the mainstream historical tradition of Islam. Rather, in his view, it is the product of the totalizing ambitions typical of modern politics and of the modernizing state. As he shows in his work, in the Islamic history, ‘there was no such thing as a state in the modern sense’. This is not to say that the fact that many contemporary Islamist movements have endorsed the idea is irrelevant – which is obviously not the case. It simply means that the fact that many Islamic militants have accepted this perspective as their own, striving for the establishment of an Islamic state, does not make it essential to Islam (Asad, 2003: 352).18¶ On the other hand, this essentialization of Islam favoured and most of the time went hand in hand with an over-emphasis on its intrinsic violence. This image of an essentially violent Islam is, in Asad’s view, the reflex of a perceived threat to Western values.19 The violence of Islamist radical movements is taken as a symbol of the violence of Islam itself, whereas¶ no liberal in the west would suggest that the Gush Emunim [‘Block of the Faithful’, a Jewish pro-settler group in Israel] represent the essence of Judaism, or that the assassination of abortion doctors in the U.S. by pro-Life activists represents the essence of Christianity. (Asad, 2003: 350)¶ The fact that many Islamic militants have reinterpreted the idea of an Islamic state as part of their Islamic tradition points to the parallel process of construction of an Islamic civilization on the part of the Muslims. ‘Orientalism’, which was born in the West, has also been re-appropriated by non-Western individuals, scholars or not. For instance, in 1992, the Saudi King Fahd declared that ‘the prevailing democratic system in the world is not suitable for us in this region, for our peoples’ composition and traits are different from the traits of that world’ (quoted in Sadowski, 1993: 14).20 Other neighbouring countries nowadays use this type of argument, according to which Arab citizens are convinced on a daily basis that democracy is not possible in their country. Similar arguments are frequently found in the literature produced by ‘oriental orientalists’ or ‘westernized orientalists’, to use the expression coined by Sadiki (2004): Ajami (2002) has become a mouthpiece for Arab support of the US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, predicting that US soldiers would be greeted with flowers in Iraq, and Zakaria (1997) wrote abundantly about illiberal democracies in the region.¶ The clash of civilizations is not just a Western political myth that has been exported and imposed on the non-Western world. The work on this myth is a work that has taken place in different contexts, each time assuming different connotations and providing significance to very different political conditions: from Al-Qa’eda terrorists incited by their leaders to violent acts against the ‘impure West’ to the re-elaboration of the post-9/11 shock all around the world.¶ The consequences of the work of this myth in Arab countries are well illuminated by Telhami (2004). In his view, there has always been a variety of political possibilities for self-identification in the Arab worlds – at least, just to mention some of the most important, pan-Arabism, Islam and nationalism as embedded in single individual states. However, a survey he conducted in June 2004 in six Arab countries revealed that more and more Arabs identify themselves as Muslims first. Telhami observed that this trend is pretty clear, even though it is not uniform, given that in Egypt and Lebanon, in contrast to Saudi Arabia and Morocco, people identify themselves as Egyptians and Lebanese more than Arabs and Muslims.¶ A parallel increase in the role of religion can be witnessed in Western countries.21 Some, for instance, have noticed the increasing role of religious arguments in public and political debates. Well-known examples are the recurrence of debates on religious symbols such as the crucifix or veils in European schools, the role of religious lobbies in US politics, or recently, the debate that took place in Europe about the inclusion or not of reference to the Christian roots in the drafting of the European Constitution. However, what is more interesting for us is the increased symbolic presence of religious icons of the clash between civilizations. For instance, the revival of the interest in the epoch of the Crusades, as proved by the increasing number of exhibitions and films devoted to this theme, has made of them and of figures such as Richard the Lion-Heart conspicuous symbols that capture and reproduce significance for a ‘West’ in search of the roots of its ‘civilization’ (Seib, 2004: 76). Similarly, new illustrated copies of the Bible and the Koran are being offered by even the most secular newspapers in Italy (see La Repubblica and La Nazione), whereas the figure of Christ has returned to the scene of Hollywood with a new blockbuster film (see e.g. The Passion of the Christ by Mel Gibson).

#### Our critical analysis is key – efforts to exclude the affirmative replicate censorship by the Bush Administration to stifle opposition to the reductionist ideology of the clash of civilizations responsible for a self-fulfilling prophecy

Bottici and Challand 6 (Chiara Bottici, University of Florence, and Benoît Challand, European University Institute, Rethinking Political Myth: The Clash of Civilizations as a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 2006, European Journal of Social Theory 9(3): 315–336) PC

Surprisingly, the idea of a clash of civilizations, when it first appeared, was strongly criticized, not to say simply dismissed by most of the scholarly literature. For instance, Huntington’s understanding of civilizations has been criticized because it surreptitiously assumes that internal variety can be classified under the one heading of ‘civilization’ (Arnason, 2001). In reply to his theory, other scholars stated that it was a clash of interests and not of cultures that had shaped contemporary politics (Gerges, 1999). Finally, others pointed out that he leaves politics out of the picture for a mistaken over-emphasis on cultural factors and that, for instance, the ongoing struggle between the United States and Islamic radicals is not the result of a clash between civilizations but rather of the behaviour of extremist groups preying upon discontent within Muslim majority states (Kupchan, 2002: 70).¶ Notwithstanding those criticisms, people increasingly came to believe that a clash between civilizations was taking place. Two independent surveys of the US media reaction to the 9/11 attacks showed that the totality of these events was framed within the paradigm of the clash of civilizations (Abrahamian, 2003; Seib, 2004). As a consequence, Huntington’s book became a bestseller to the point that by 2002 Netscape was offering Internet surfers free copies (Abrahamian, 2003: 529).¶ For example, immediately after the attacks, the New York Times launched a new section entitled ‘A Nation Challenged’ which appeared every day for the next four months. The titles of the articles appearing in this section mostly referred to a clash between Islam and the West: ‘Yes, this is about Islam’, ‘Jihad 101’, ‘Barbarians at the gates’, ‘The force of Islam’, ‘The core of Muslim rage’, ‘Dreams of Holy War’, ‘The deep intellectual roots of Islamic rage’, ‘The age of Muslim wars’, ‘This is a religious war’ (Abrahamian, 2003). This latter article was illustrated with pictures of atrocities from medieval Europe, including Goya’s Spanish Inquisition (Sullivan, 2001). Similarly, an article in the Washington Post written by an expert on religion, warned that the government should take care to respect Islam because its ‘awakening’ had pitted a huge section of the world against the West. The article was entitled ‘A Fervor America Should Easily Recog- nise’ and was accompanied by a photo of hooded men carrying the Koran and a hatchet (Morgan, 2001).¶ All these titles referred to cultural and religious factors, leaving political explanations completely aside. In contrast to their European counterparts, who invoked the US and European policies in the Middle East as a major source of explanations for the attacks (see e.g. Halliday, 2001; Fisk, 2001), the US media played down all attempts to bring politics back to the forefront. According to Thomas Friedman (2002), the ‘highjackers left no demands because they had none at all’. In his view, these terrorists had no political demands because their real driving force was Muslim rage against Western civilization. All the evidence pointing to the political dimensions of the attacks was ignored if not actively deleted from the leading headlines. For instance, at the beginning of Bin Laden’s first tape relayed by al-Jazeerah, he explicitly stated that the highjackers’ motivation was precisely ‘the 80 years of wars’ waged in the Middle East, but the White House advised the media not to broadcast such ‘inflammatory propaganda’ and the media agreed to edit future tapes too (Carter, 2001). Another tape released by Bin Laden, in which he explicitly affirmed that the aim of the attacks was, among others, ‘to avenge our people killed in Palestine’ was not even aired in the USA. It came to be known only through its publication in Europe and Blair’s mentioning it in a press conference in the States (Abrahamian, 2003: 536).8¶ But how can it be that a theory that has been so strongly criticized as too simplistic has become such a successful narrative through which so many people read the contemporary world? This was the result of a work on the narrative of the clash between civilizations that started long before September 11 and that took place, as we will see, in the media as well as in intellectual discourses and other kind of social practices. The result of this work, which has actually intensified after 9/11, is that this narrative has become one of the most powerful images through which people both in Western and non-Western societies perceive the world and act within it. For instance, if by September 2001, as we have seen, European newspapers were reluctant to adopt this scheme, by December 2004 an article appearing in The Times openly stated that ‘Islamic fundamentalism is causing a clash of civilizations between liberal democracies and Muslims’ (Bremner, 2004). Even more striking, an Ipsos poll quoted in the¶ same article revealed that 48% of Italians believed that a ‘clash of civilizations’ was under way and that ‘Islam is a religion more fanatical than any other’ (Bremner, 2004).¶ In order to show the mechanisms through which this change has happened, one must not only look at what is explicitly said about the clash of civilizations and the threat of Islam. The work on myth takes place on a much more subtle level, placed between what is consciously learned and what is unconsciously apprehended by exposure to it.

#### This space is key—interrogating Islamophobia in educational settings is critical to establish a critical consciousness that enables larger projects

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[Jan. 04 2012, Shirin Housee works at the School of Humanities, Languages and Social Sciences, University of Wolverhampton, UK “What’s the point? Anti-racism and students’ voices against Islamophobia”, Volume 15, Issue 1]

Having reflected on the two seminar sessions on Islamophobia and the student comments, I am convinced that the work of anti-racism in university classrooms is fundamentally important. As one student said racism is real. Through racism people suffer physically, psychologically, socially, educationally and politically. Our work in university classrooms is just the beginning of this challenge against racisms and other oppressions. Classroom discussions and general teaching form a very important contribution to this work of anti racism in education. There are no short cuts or painless cuts; the work of anti-racism is a difficult one. As educators we should make use of classroom exchanges; students’ engaged learning could be the key to promoting anti-racism in our class. My goal is to teach in a way that engages students and leads them to reflect on the socio-economic political/religions issues that surrounds theirs (our) lives. This article argues for making anti-racist thinking possible in class. The student voice, that critiques mainstream thinking as found in the media and elsewhere, is a starting point for this political work. I argue that teaching and learning in our classroom should encourage the critical consciousness necessary for pursuing social justice. Whilst I acknowledge the limits of doing anti-racist campaign in university spaces, I argue that this is a good starting point. And who knows, these educational exchanges may become (as with my own story) the awakening for bigger political projects against injustices in our society. In conclusion I endorse social justice advocates, such as Cunningham (cited in Johnson-Bailey 2002, 43) who suggest that educators re-direct classroom practices and the curriculum, because: ‘if we are not working for equity in our teaching and learning environments, then…educators are inadvertently maintaining the status quo.’ In conclusion I argue that a classroom where critical race exchanges and dialogues take place is a classroom where students and teachers can be transformed. Transformative social justice education calls on people to develop social, political and personal awareness of the damages of racism and other oppressions. I end by suggesting that in the current times of Islamophobic racism, when racist attacks are a daily occurrence, in August and September 2010 alone, nearly 30 people have been racially abused and physically attacked (Institute of Race Relations 2010). The point of studying racism, therefore, is to rise to the anti-racist challenge, and for me, a place to start this campaign is within Higher Education Institutions, optimistic as it might sound, I believe, as asserted by Sheridan (cited in Van Driel 2004) that: ‘Education can enlighten students and promote positive attitudes…. Education settings can be the first arena in which battles can be fought against Islamophobia. It is to education that our attention should be directed.’ (162)

#### Without a criticism of the way we construct the Muslim identity, legal reformism is doomed to failure. That criticism is impossible under current policy-making frameworks, because they reaffirm Western norms and posit Muslims and non-Western institutions as antithetical to those norms.

Volpp 2 (Leti Volpp, Associate Professor, American University, Washington College of Law, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 2002, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1575) PC

In the American imagination, those who appear "Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim" may be theoretically entitled to formal rights, but they do not stand in for or represent the nation. Instead, they are interpellated as antithetical to the citizen's sense of identity. Citizenship in the form of legal status does not guarantee that they will be constitutive of the American body politic. In fact, quite the opposite: The consolidation of American identity takes place against them.¶ While many scholars approach citizenship as identity as if it were derivative of citizenship's other dimensions, it seems as if the guarantees of citizenship as status, rights, and politics are insufficient to produce citizenship as identity. n78 Thus, one may formally be a U.S. citizen and formally entitled to various legal guarantees, but one will stand outside of the membership of kinship/solidarity that structures the U.S. nation. And clearly, falling outside of the identity of the "citizen" can reduce the ability to exercise citizenship as a political or legal matter. Thus, the general failure to identify people who appear "Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim" as constituting American [\*1595] national identity reappears to haunt their ability to enjoy citizenship as a matter of rights, in the form of being free from violent attack.¶ Thus, the boundaries of the nation continue to be constructed through excluding certain groups. The "imagined community" n79 of the American nation, constituted by loyal citizens, is relying on difference from the "Middle Eastern terrorist" to fuse its identity at a moment of crisis. Discourses of democracy used to support the U.S. war effort rest on an image of anti-democracy, in the form of those who seek to destroy the "American way of life." n80 The idea that there are norms that are antithetical to "Western values" of liberty and equality helps solidify this conclusion.¶ We can consider whether the way in which identity disrupts citizenship is inevitable. Race has fundamentally contradicted the promise of liberal democracy, including citizenship. While liberalism claimed to promise universal liberty and equality, these were in fact only guaranteed to propertied, European male subjects. n81 While some might believe in the promise of universality - that one can infinitely expand the ambit of who is entitled to rights and freedoms - race and other markers appear and reappear to patrol the borders of belonging to political communities. n82 Despite the liberal universalizing [\*1596] discourse of citizenship, not all citizens are equal. n83 These events make apparent how identity in the form of foreignness, or perpetual extraterritorialization, n84 means that the circling of wagons is an uneven process, that drawing tighter together takes place through the expulsion of some.¶ Recent theorizing about diasporic or transnational subjects, while productive in many regards, has on occasion minimized the continued salience of the nation, both in terms of shaping identity and in the form of governmental control. n85 In particular, discussions charting the decline of the nation-state have led to unfortunate implications when two points are stretched to extremes: First, the idea that immigrant communities have complete [\*1597] agency in determining their location and their national identity; and second, the idea that the borders of the nation can be traversed with the greatest of ease and are so reduced as to become almost meaningless. n86¶ Arjun Appadurai, in an essay titled Patriotism and its Futures, written at what was perhaps a more optimistic moment, suggests that we "need to think ourselves beyond the nation," for we now find ourselves in a postnational era. n87 America, he suggests, is "eminently suited to be a sort of cultural laboratory and a free trade zone" to test a "world organized around diasporic diversity." n88 Appadurai argues that the United States should be considered "yet another diasporic switching point, to which people come to seek their fortunes but are no longer content to leave their homelands behind." n89¶ If only this were indeed a postnational era. In a response, titled Transnationalism and its Pasts, Kandice Chuh criticizes the evenness of power relations within and across national borders implied in Appadurai's postnation. n90 Chuh emphasizes the link between transnationalism and state coercion, and reminds us of the forced removal and internment of Japanese Americans by the U.S. government during World War II. n91 A transnational extension of Japan into the United States was relied upon to justify this dispossession. This memory is instructive to us now. We should remember that the idea of transnationality is not solely one where immigrants function as agents in maintaining diasporic ties, but can be one where a state or its people brands its citizens with foreign membership, extraterritorializing them into internment [\*1598] camps, or ejecting them from membership through violence against their bodies. n92¶ We function not just as agents of our own imaginings, but as the objects of others' exclusions. Despite frequent rhetorical claims, this society is neither colorblind nor a happy "nation of immigrants." Certain racialized bodies are always marked and disrupt the idea of integration or assimilation. n93

#### **Discourse and representations matter –** apocalyptic terrorism scenarios are grounded in vested political interests and violent modes of national-identity formation in which political reforms are used to carve the world into liberal and illiberal spheres---the impact is a racist extermination of alterity and expansive structural violence

Bryan 12 (Desiree, Research Assistant Intern at Middle East Institute. MScECON Candidate: Security Studies at Aberystwyth University, The Popularity of the ‘New Terrorism’ Discourse, http://www.e-ir.info/2012/06/22/the-popularity-of-the-new-terrorism-discourse/)

New Terrorism vs. Old Terrorism

The opening sentence of a textbook on terrorism states, “Terrorism has been a dark feature of human behavior since the dawn of recorded history” (Martin, 2010, 3). If this is the case, what makes the ‘new terrorism’ different from the old? According to the mainstream orthodoxy on terrorism, the old terrorism was generally characterized by: left wing ideology; the use of small scale, conventional weapons; clearly identifiable organizations or movements with equally clear political and social messages; specific selection of targets and “explicit grievances championing specific classes or ethnonational groups” (Martin, 2010, 28).¶ Also according to the orthodoxy, the shift to the new terrorism, on the other hand, is thought to have emerged in the early 1990s (Jackson, 2011) and took root in mass consciousness with the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S. (Martin, 2010, 3). The new terrorism is characterized by: “loose, cell-based networks with minimal lines of command and control,” “desired acquisition of high-intensity weapons and weapons of mass destruction” (Martin, 2010, 27), “motivated by religious fanaticism rather than political ideology and it is aimed at causing mass causality and maximum destruction” (Jackson, 2007, 179-180).¶ However, these dichotomous definitions of the old and new types of terrorism are not without problems. The first major problem is that terrorism has been characterized by the same fundamental qualities throughout history. Some of the superficial characteristics, the means of implementation (e.g. the invention of the Internet or dynamite) or the discourse (communism vs. Islam) may have evolved, but the central components remain the same. The second major problem is that the characterization of new terrorism is, at best, rooted in a particular political ideology, biased and inaccurate. At worst, it is racist, promotes war mongering and has contributed to millions of deaths. As David Rapoport states:¶ Many contemporary studies begin … by stating that although terrorism has always been a feature of social existence, it became ‘significant’ … when it ‘increased in frequency’ and took on ‘novel dimensions’ as an international or transnational activity, creating in the process a new ‘mode of conflict’ (1984, 658).¶ Isabelle Duyvesteyn points out that this would indicate evidence for the emergence of a new type of terrorism, if it were not for the fact that the article was written in 1984 and described a situation from the 1960s (Duyvesteyn, 2004, 439). It seems that there have been many new phases of terrorism over the years. So many so that the definition of ‘new’ has been stretched significantly and applied relatively across decades. Nevertheless, the idea that this terrorism, that which the War on Terror (WoT) is directed against, is the most significant and unique form of terrorism that has taken hold in the popular and political discourse. Therefore, it is useful to address each of the so-called new characteristics in turn.¶ The first characteristic is the idea that new terrorism is based on loosely organized cell-based networks as opposed to the traditional terrorist groups, which were highly localized and hierarchical in nature. An oft-cited example of a traditional terrorist group is the Irish Republican Army (IRA), who operated under a military structure and in a relatively (in contrast to the perceived transnational operations of al-Qaeda) localized capacity. However, some of the first modern terrorists were not highly organized groups but small fragmented groups of anarchists. These groups were heeding the call of revolutionary anarchist Mikhail Bakunin and other contemporary anarchists to achieve anarchism, collectivism and atheism via violent means (Morgan, 2001, 33). Despite the initial, self-described “amorphous” nature of these groups, they were a key force in the Russian Revolution (Maximoff, G.). Furthermore, leading anarchist philosophers of the Russian Revolution argued that terrorists “should organize themselves into small groups, or cells” (Martin, 2010, 217). These small groups cropped up all around Russia and Europe in subsequent years and formed an early form of a “loosely organized cell-based network” not unlike modern day al Qaeda. Duyvesteyn further notes that both the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which was founded in 1964, and Hezbollah, founded 1982, operate on a network structure with very little central control over groups (2004, 444).¶ The second problematic idea of new terrorism is that contemporary terrorist groups aim to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). This belief is simply not supported by empirical evidence. One of the key problems with this theory is that WMDs are significantly more difficult to obtain and utilize than most people understand. Even if a terrorist group were to obtain a biological WMD, “Biologist Matthew Meselson calculates that it would take a ton of nerve gas or five tons of mustard gas to produce heavy causalities among unprotected people in an open area of one square kilometer” (Mueller, 2005, 488). And that’s only an example of the problem with the implementation of WMDs, assuming they are acquired, transported and desirable by a terrorist group in the first place. Additional problems, such as the fact that WMDs “are extremely difficult to deploy and control” (Mueller, 2005, 488) and that making a bomb “is an extraordinarily difficult task” (Mueller, 2005, 489), further diminish the risk. It is interesting to note that, while the potential dangers of WMDs are much lauded, the attacks of September 11th were low tech and had been technologically possible for more than 100 years. Mueller also states, “although nuclear weapons have been around for well over half a century, no state has ever given another state (much less a terrorist group) a nuclear weapon that the recipient could use independently” (2005, 490).¶ All of this talk about the difficultly of acquiring and deploying WMDs (by non-state agents), is not to diminish the question of what terrorists have to gain by utilizing these weapons. It is important to question whether it would even further the aims of terrorists to use WMDs. The evidence suggests otherwise. In the “Politics of Fear” Jackson states, “Mass casualties are most often counterproductive to terrorist aims – they alienate their supporters and can provoke harsh reprisals from the authorities […]” in addition, “[…] they would undermine community support, distort the terrorist’s political message, and invite over-whelming retaliation” (2007, 196-197). Despite popular rhetoric to the contrary, terrorists are “rational political actors and are acutely aware of these dangers” (Jackson, 2007, 197). Government appointed studies on this issue have supported these views.¶ This leads us to the third problem with new terrorism, which is the idea that we are facing a new era of terrorism motivated by religious fanaticism rather than political ideology. As stated previously, earlier, so-called traditional forms of terrorism are associated with left wing, political ideology, whereas contemporary terrorists are described as having “anti-modern goals of returning society to an idealized version of the past and are therefore necessarily anti-democratic, anti-progressive and, by implication, irrational” (Gunning and Jackson, 3). Rapoport argues the idea that religious terrorists are irrational, saying, “what seems to be distinctive about modern [religious] terrorists, their belief that terror can be organized rationally, represents or distorts a major theme peculiar to our own culture […]” (1984, 660). Conveniently for the interests of the political elites, as we shall see later, the idea of irrational fanaticism makes the notion of negotiation and listening to the demands of the other impossible. In light of this, it is interesting to note that the U.S. has, for decades, given billions of dollars in aid to the State of Israel, which could be argued to be a fundamentalist, religious organization that engages in the terrorization of a group of people. Further, it is difficult to speak of The Troubles in Northern Ireland without speaking of the religious conflict, yet it was never assumed that the IRA was “absolutist, inflexible, unrealistic, lacking in political pragmatism, and not amenable to negotiation” (Gunning and Jackson, 4). Rapaport further reinforces the idea that religious terrorism goes back centuries by saying, “Before the nineteenth century, religion provided the only acceptable justifications for terror…” (1984, 659).¶ As we have seen here, problems with the discourse of new terrorism include the fact that these elements of terrorism are neither new nor are the popular beliefs of the discourse supported by empirical evidence. The question remains, then, why is the idea of new terrorism so popular? This question will be addressed next.¶ Political Investment in New Terrorism¶ There are two main categories that explain the popularity of new terrorism. The first category is government and political investment in the propagation of the idea that a distinct, historically unknown type of terrorism exists. The mainstream discourse [1] reinforces, through statements by political elites, media, entertainment and every other way imaginable, the culture of violence, militarism and feelings of fear. Through mass media, cultural norms and the integration of neoliberal ideology into society, people are becoming increasingly desensitized to human rights issues, war, social justice and social welfare, not to mention apathetic to the political process in general.¶ The discourse of the WoT is merely the contemporary incarnation of this culture of fear and violence. In the past, various threats have included American Indians, women, African Americans, communists, HIV/AIDS and drugs, to name but a few (Campbell, 1992). It can be argued that there are four main political functions of terrorism discourse. The first is as a distraction from other, more immediate and domestic social problems such as poverty, employment, racial inequality, health and the environment. The second, more sinister function is to control dissent. In looking at both of these issues Jackson states:¶ There are a number of clear political advantages to be gained from the creation of social anxiety and moral panics. In the first place, fear is a disciplining agent and can be effectively deployed to de-legitimise dissent, mute criticism, and constrain internal opponents. […] Either way, its primary function is to ease the pressures of accountability for political elites. As instrument of elite rule, political fear is in effect a political project aimed at reifying existing structures of power. (Politics of Fear, 2007, 185).¶ Giroux further reinforces the idea that a culture of fear creates conformity and deflects attention from government accountability by saying, “the ongoing appeal to jingoistic forms of patriotism divert the public from addressing a number of pressing domestic and foreign issues; it also contributes to the increasing suppression of dissent” (2003, 5).¶ Having a problem that is “ubiquitous, catastrophic, and fairly opaque” (Jackson, Politics of Fear, 2007, 185) is useful to political elites, because it is nearly impossible to address the efficacy of combating the problem. At least, empirical evaluation can be, and is, easily discouraged in academic circles through research funding directives. Domestic problems such as the unemployment rate or health care reform, on the other hand, are directly measurable and heavily monitored by domestic sources. It is possible to account for the success or failure of policies designed to address these types of problems and the (re)election of politicians often depends heavily on success in these areas. However, the public is neither involved on a participative level nor, often, socially aware of what is happening in murkier and unreachable areas like foreign policy.¶ The third political investment in maintaining the terrorism discourse has to do with economics. “At a material level, there are a great many vested interests in maintaining the widespread condition of fear, not least for the military-industrial complex which benefits directly from increased spending on national security” (Jackson, Politics of Fear, 2007, 186). This is true with all forms of crime and insecurity as all of them factor into the greater security-industrial complex. Not only do these industries employ millions of people and support their families, they boost the economy. Barry Buzan talks of these the importance of these issues to both the government and the public in terms of a ‘threat-deficit’ – meaning that U.S. policy and society is dependent on having an external threat (Buzan, 2007, 1101).¶ The fourth key political interest in terrorism discourse is constructing a national identity. This will be discussed more thoroughly in the following section, however, it is important to acknowledge the role the WoT (and previous threats) has had on constructing and reinforcing a collective identity. Examples of this can be seen in the discourse and the subsequent reaction to anyone daring to step outside the parameters of the Bush Administration-established narrative in the days immediately following the September 11th attacks. A number of journalists, teachers and university professors lost their jobs for daring to speak out in criticism of U.S. policy and actions following the attacks. In 2001, Lynne Cheney attacked the then deputy chancellor of the New York City Schools, Judith Rizzo, for saying “terrorist attacks demonstrated the importance of teaching about Muslim cultures” (Giroux, 2003, 22). According to Giroux, this form of jingoistic patriotism “becomes a euphemism for shutting down dissent, eliminating critical dialogue, and condemning critical citizenship in the interest of conformity and a dangerous departure from what it means to uphold a viable democracy” (2003, 24). The message is, we are not the other (Muslims), patriotism equals agreement and compliance and our identity is based on the shared values of liberty and justice.¶ According to Carol Winkler, “Negative ideographs contribute to our collective identity by branding behavior that is unacceptable … American society defines itself as much by its opposition to tyranny and slavery as it does by a commitment to liberty” (Winkler, 2006, 12). Terrorism, and by association in this case, Islam, functions as a negative ideograph of American values. It thereby tells us what our values and our identity are by telling us who the enemy is and who we are not. According to Jackson, “[…] some have argued that Western identity is dependent on the appropriation of a backward, illiberal, violent Islamic ‘other’ against which the West can organize a collective liberal, civilized ‘self’ and consolidate its cultural and political norms” (Jackson, Constructing Enemies, 2007, 420).¶ Through this analysis we can see there are four key ways in which the hegemonic system is invested in propagating a culture of fear and violence and terrorism discourse. Not only is it key for political elites to support this system, it is also crucial that there be an ever renewing threat that is uniquely different from past threats. These new threats allow for the investment of significantly more resources, the continuation of the economy, the renewal of a strong sense of cultural identity and the indoctrination and obedience of new generations of society. This essay will now look at how individual and collective psychology supports the popularity of the new terrorism discourse.¶ Psychology of the Masses¶ The second category of reasons why new terrorism discourse is popular can be called the psychology of the masses. There are a number of factors that fall under this category such as: the hyper-reality of the modern era; the culture of fear; the carryover of historical archetypes and the infiltration of neoliberal values into cultural norms. The topic of social and individual psychology and how it relates to the propagation and acceptance of hegemonic discourse is broad. It is also an important aspect of critical terrorism studies and merits further exploration. However, in this section will outline the basis for the popularity of new terrorism discourse and discuss several ways in which this popularity is manifested and reinforced in contemporary society.

#### Deconstructing and interrogating flawed assumptions behind Islamophobia is critical to establish a transformative and liberatory pedagogy that enables us as agents to challenge racist dynamics

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As an anti-racism scholar and educator, fellow colleagues and I realized from as early as September 12 that there was an urgency to frame a critical pedagogical response to address and challenge the rampant Islamophobia affecting the realities of Muslims from all walks of life and social conditions. Among the most vulnerable were children and youth, who received little support from schools in dealing with the backlash that many were experiencing on a routine basis. Most schools were reluctant to engage in any response beyond the politically neutral arena of “crisis management.” Among the school districts that I was in contact with, there was a clear resistance to addressing or even naming issues of racism and Islamophobia. In fact, the discursive language to name and define the experiences that Muslims were encountering on a day-to-day basis did not even exist within the educational discourse. While schools were reluctant to name specific incidents as racism – part of an all-too-common denial – the notion of “Islamophobia” did not have any currency at all. In fact, it was not a part of the language or conceptual constructs commonly used by educators, even by those committed to multicultural and antiracist pedagogy. I realized the urgency to map a new epistemological and pedagogical terrain by creating an educational framework for addressing Islamophobia. Within the existing equity-based educational frameworks, one could find the conceptual and pedagogical tools to address issues of racism, classism, sexism, homophobia, ableism, and anti-Semitism. However, the discursive foundations for dealing with Islamophobia and the accompanying educational resources simply did not exist. Developing a new framework to fill this gap involved coining a new term: “Anti-Islamophobia Education.” Being able to name and define the experience of Muslims as the result of Islamophobia was critical to shaping the kind of interventions that would take place from a critical educational standpoint. Before outlining a methodology for conducting anti-Islamophobia education, it was necessary to develop some discursive foundations, arrive at a definition of Islamophobia, and create an understanding of what it was that we sought to challenge and resist. From a socio-psychological standpoint, the notion of Islamophobia is often loosely translated as an “attitude of fear, mistrust, or hatred of Islam and its adherents.” However, this definition presents a narrow conceptual framework and does not take into account the social, structural, and ideological dimensions through which forms of oppression are operationalized and enacted. Applying a more holistic analysis, far from being based on mere “ignorance,” Islamophobic attitudes are, in fact, part of a rational system of power and domination that manifests as individual, ideological, and systemic forms of discrimination and oppression. The idea that discrimination, be it based on race, class, gender, sexuality, ability, or religion, simply stems from “ignorance” allows those engaged in oppressive acts and policies to claim a space of innocence. By labeling Islamophobia as an essentially “irrational” fear, this conception denies the logic and rationality of social dominance and oppression, which operates on multiple social, ideological, and systemic levels. Therefore, to capture the complex dimensions through which Islamophobia operates, it is necessary to extend the definition from its limited conception as a “fear and hatred of Islam and Muslims” and acknowledge that these attitudes are intrinsically linked to individual, ideological, and systemic forms of oppression that support the logic and rationale of specific power relations. For example, individual acts of oppression include such practices as name-calling or personal assault, while systemic forms of oppression refer to the structural conditions of inequality regulated through such institutional practices as racial profiling or denying jobs or housing opportunities. These exclusionary practices are shored up by specific ideological underpinnings, among them the purveyed notions designed to pathologize Muslims as “terrorists” and impending threats to public safety. Understanding the dimensions of how systems of oppression such as Islamophobia operate socially, ideologically, and systemically became a key component of developing educational tools that would help build the critical skills needed to analyze and challenge these dynamics. From a discursive standpoint, I locate anti-Islamophobia education within a integrative anti-racism framework5 that views systems of oppression based on race, class, gender, sexuality, ability, and religion as part of a multiple and interlocking nexus that reinforce and sustain one another. Based on this understanding, I have mapped some key epistemological foundations for anti-Islamophobia education.6 This includes the need to “reclaim the stage” through which Islam is represented from the specter of terrorists and suicide bombers to a platform of peace and social justice. “Reclaiming the stage” requires adopting a pedagogical approach that shifts the popular media discourse away from the negative, essentialized referents and tropes of abject “Otherness” ascribed to Muslims. This move involves presenting a critical counter-narrative in order to reframe the Manichean worldview and “clash of civilizations” narratives typically being purveyed in order to present a more nuanced, reasoned, and critical perspective of the global sociopolitical realities that Muslim individuals and societies are confronting, engaging, and challenging. Another foundational aspect of anti-Islamophobia education involves interrogating the systemic mechanisms through which Islamophobia is reinforced, by analytically unraveling the dynamics of power in society that sustain social inequality. Racial profiling, which targets groups on the basis of their race, ethnicity, faith, or other aspects of social difference, and similar issues are major systemic barriers that criminalize and pathologize entire communities. In schools, the practice of “color-coded streaming,” whereby a disproportionate number of racially and ethnically marginalized youth are channeled into lower non-academic level streams, is another example of institutionalized racism. Negative perceptions held by teachers and guidance counselors toward racialized students have often led to assumptions of failure or limited chances for success, based on such false stereotypes as the notion that “Islam doesn’t value education for girls” or “Black students won’t succeed.” These negative attitudes are relayed to students through the “hidden curriculum” of schooling and lead to lower expectations being placed upon youth from specific communities.7 Developing critical pedagogical tools to analyze and develop challenges to these systems of domination is part of building a transformative and liberatory pedagogy, one geared toward achieving greater social justice in both schools and society. Another key goal of anti-Islamophobia education involves the need to demystify stereotypes. Since 9/11, renewed Orientalist constructions of difference have permeated the representation of Muslims in media and popular culture. Images of fanatical terrorists and burqa-clad women are seen as the primary markers of the Muslim world. Deconstructing and demystifying these stereotypes is vital to helping students develop a critical literacy of the politics of media and image-making. Critically examining the destructive impact of how these images create the social and ideological divide between “us” and “them” is important to exposing how power operates through the politics of representation.

### 2AC T

#### 1) We meet – we criticize the President’s War Powers Authority in the area of indefinite detention. <Their evidence is not about advocacy, so criticism solves.>

#### 2) Counter-interpretation – criticism of a Presidential War Power in at least one of the topic areas solves all their offense:

#### a) Predictability – keeps arguments rooted in detention lit, which guarantees that the neg will have research about the aff.

#### b) Ground – they can read all of their defenses of Presidential War Powers, <like the terrorism da, drone shift da, rendition da, and flexibility da> and challenge our method or descriptions in the aff. <Also, they can read detention-related counterplans against our aff to create a legal process debate.>

#### c) Better for debate – they make debate stale, resulting in the same heg aff versus agent cp/politics, or an agent CP with an Islamophobic net benefit. We encourage innovation by exploring philosophical and methodological arguments. We also give actual debates over indefinite detention instead of trivial agent comparisons, so we solve better – <debates over the WOT are better, because they access our public opinion arguments>

#### d) <Debate doesn’t solve any of their process good arguments, because we have a competitive incentive to fiat through the procedural nuances, and create a counterplan with the smallest change from the aff, that fiats through legal hurdles>

#### 3) Bureaucracy DA – they reduce debates about Islamophobia to bureaucratic procedures, obscuring how racism becomes institutionalized –turns extra T

Nabi 11 (Shaida-Raffat Nabi, University of Manchester How is Islamophobia Institutionalised? Racialised Governmentality and the Case of Muslim Students in British Universities, 2011) PC

The idea of ‘institutional racism’ in Macpherson’s Report, in academic literature and as translated in university practices, each pose distinct problems that require us to rethink how we understand racism in institutions and beyond. This rethink arguably requires a distinction between ‘institutional’ and institutionalised racism. Thus, whilst ‘institutional racism’ is conventionally identified within the formalised functions of an institution (i.e. policies, practices and procedures, or as the Islamophobia report identifies, in “laws, customs or practices” (CBMI 2004, p.14), institutionalised racism far exceeds, although certainly includes, this bureaucratic terrain. It can instead be characterised by hegemonic norms, and the diffusion of racist discourses that span society generally, rather than institutions per se. It is also concerned with locating racism within a much broader historical trajectory, rather than within the confines of a- historic institutional procedure. The Macpherson report does minimally reflect this embedded aspect of racism through its acknowledgement of the “informal”, “implicit” routinisation of racism (Hall 1999, p.195). However, what Macpherson and his interlocutors fail to attend to is how racism has become institutionalised at all. As Hesse observed “the concept of Institutional racism had entered a public domain that had no specification of a history or cultural formation” (Hesse 2004a, p.131). It emerges in a historical vacuum remaining unlinked to any particular discourse in spite of the fact that historically, racism was institutionalised through Britain’s Empire. That Macpherson did not articulate “where it came from, how it got here” (Hesse and Sayyid 2006, p.26), resulted in a rather sloppy, more comfortable way of accounting for its presence. This, Hesse argues, has “undermined the debate about institutional racism” (Hesse 2004a, p.131). The lack of a colonial specification in Macpherson’s account (Macpherson 1999 see 6.1 - 6.63) is indeed peculiar, especially given the reports reference to Carmichael and Hamilton’s text (ibid. 6.33), which stated that “institutional racism has another name: colonialism” (Carmichael and Hamilton 1968, p.5). Instead, the report contains more muted references to policing in a society no longer ‘white’ (Macpherson 1999, 6.20) and of a “19th century institution being dragged into the 21st century” (ibid. 6.61). This omission can perhaps be understood as part of the ‘white amnesia’ (Hesse 1997, p.87) that mire discussions of racism generally. However, other literature are also beset by tensions reflective of the report (e.g. structure/agency, witting/unwitting, individual/collective) (for example Anthias 1999; Wight 2003, p.712) and sidestep the issue of coloniality altogether. In view of the misplaced focus of the report, Bourne for example considers the “symbiosis between institutional racism and state racism” (Bourne 2001, p.19-20) as key. Cole critiques Macpherson’s “a-historical” definition of institutional racism but then proceeds to consider it a “reality” from “the origins of the Welfare state” (Cole 2004, p.38, 35). Neither of these accounts explain how the state has acquired its racialised configuration. However, if we identify institutionalised racism as a condition of coloniality located “in the obscured inadequacies of western decolonisation and the disavowed continuities of its liberal/colonial practices” (Hesse 2004a, p.144), it is difficult to maintain a narrow understanding of racism in ‘white’ institutions. Thus whilst institutionalised racism can be said to include narrow forms of ‘institutional’ racism, that is, of the procedural variety, it also far exceeds these boundaries. Closely aligned with Essed’s conception of “everyday racism” it “transcends the traditional distinctions between institutional and individual racism” (Essed 1991, p.37). In the context of fieldwork these distinctions appear perverse because they sever “procedures from the people who make and enact them” (ibid. p.36). These distinctions are however, maintained in the Macpherson report (Macpherson 1999, 6.15). They also imply, as Macpherson’s definition was keen to make emphatic, that institutional racism is the outcome of “un-witting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness, and racist stereotyping” (ibid. 6.34).26 Unwitting racism is equated with the idea of unconscious and unintentional practices, where racism is ‘covert’ (ibid. 6.17). Although this understanding elides the multiplicity of racism in institutions, it has nonetheless predominated in accounts that maintain a distinction between individual (overt) and institutional (covert) racism (Carmichael and Hamilton 1968, p.4; Mills 1997, p.75). This is also echoed in the Parekh report (Parekh 2000, p.57-59), and in the 2004 Islamophobia report which suggests that occupational culture produces a subtle ‘hidden’ form of racism that is practiced routinely but is neither conscious nor intentional (CBMI 2004, p.14). One outcome of these accounts is they produce a blind-spot where ‘overt’ racism in institutions is rendered exceptional in spite of its conventionality and conversely, ‘covert’ racism is assumed to be without intent. Clearly, this is misleading and obscures the way racism in institutions can be articulated in multiple ways. Hesse has argued that this understanding of covert is weak and better understood as concealed, disguised and “consistent in its...strategic affect” rather than unwitting and idiosyncratic (Hesse 2004a, p.144) as suggested by Macpherson. This better describes one aspect of institutionalised racism with which this thesis is concerned. Namely, the way in which racism is concealed through ostensibly democratic discourse and bound up in political strategy as narrated in Chapter Six. Further, if institutionalised racism is the outcome of a White hegemonic order, this order is not confined to institutions but circulates through various sites, comprises of accumulative knowledge, and allows statesmen, intellectuals and citizens alike the cultural authority to manage ‘Others’ (Hage 1998). To some degree then, all racism is institutionalised because it relies on ‘white’ group power (Essed 1991, p.40-41). In this sense, racism can be seen in a pattern of “culturally familiar and habitual lines of argument” (Wetherell 1998, p.400) not reducible to individuals but part of a broader discursive repertoire. These repertoires are of course are never static or always explicit, but change shape and appropriate other discourses. Hence, whilst the need to make clear distinctions, for example, institutional/non-institutional or organisational/societal (see for example Mullard in Casciani, BBC 2009) is considered politically desirable, it is my contention that this obscures our understanding of racism and disguises the intimate relationship between forms and sites of racism. In this sense, the bureaucratic variety of racism that predominate accounts of racism in institutions cannot be divorced from broader ‘social’ accounts of racism. Institutionalised racism is thus better understood as symbiotic and part of a continuum of repeat victimisation (Williams 1985, p.330; Frost 2008, p.567). This has been highlighted in fieldwork for several reasons. In particular in the way the weight of multiple institutions (state, intelligence, media) have come to bear on Muslim subjectivities within universities. Institutionalised racism thus accounts for the dialectic between institutions but also between spaces designated as ‘institutional’ and ‘non-institutional’. Institutionalised racism can therefore be understood to be directed at subjects operating in “zones of in-distinction”, beyond (but not excluding) disciplinary enclosures (Duken and Lausten 2002).

#### 5) The role of the ballot is to vote for the team with the best analysis of culture and representations. Discourse and representations are used by scholarship to cast the Islamic Other as a threat and distract political interests from addressing structural violence – that means the cultural criticism of the 1AC comes before any discussion of policy. That’s 1AC Bryan.

#### 6) Self-fulfilling prophecy DA – their attempt prioritize policy-making over representations mirrors the efforts by Bush to censor criticisms of U.S. policy by bin Laden. That props up the clash of civilizations myth responsible for imperialistic foreign policy and racial profiling – turns decision-making. That’s 1AC Bottici and Challand.

#### 7) Epistemology DA – rooting debate in a fair division of ground, fiat, switch-sides debate, and roleplaying reinforces the belief in the Cartesian subject viewing arguments from the point-zero perspective. This universalizes Western epistemology and deems Islamic epistemologies inferior, allowing so-called ‘experts’ to link Islam with terrorism, justifying indefinite detention and creating bad education. That’s 1AC Grosfoguel and Mielants.

#### 8) Rationality DA – They turn debate into a Kantian search for universal truth about a plan, divorcing truth-seeking from social conditions. This justifies the discriminatory secular state, masked under religious tolerance to privilege societal stability – <also means no topical version of the aff solves>. That’s 1AC Asad.

#### 9) Their attempt to root debate in state action perpetuates Islamophobic Western norms:

#### A) Academia’s focus on democracy and human rights has excluded non-Western epistemologies. This perpetuates racial profiling, by deeming individuals who introduce alternative notions of policy as fundamentalists. That recreates the notion of the dangerous Muslim fanatic, justifying discrimination. That’s 1AC Grosfoguel.

#### B) Framing the democratic state as a progressive institution capable of solving its problems reinforces constructions of the East as anti-democratic and barbaric, which recreates the impacts of the aff

Volpp 2 (Leti Volpp, Associate Professor, American University, Washington College of Law, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 2002, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1575) PC

We are witnessing the redeployment of old Orientalist tropes. Historically, Asia and the Middle East have functioned as phantasmic sites on which the U.S. nation projects a series of anxieties regarding internal and external threats to the coherence of the national body. n40 The national identity of the United States has been constructed in opposition to those categorized as "foreigners," "aliens," and "others."¶ Edward Said describes Orientalism as a master discourse of European civilization that constructs and polarizes the East and the West. Western representations of the East serve not only to define those who are the objects of the Orientalizing gaze, but also the West, which is defined through its opposition to the East. Thus, for example, the West is defined as modern, democratic, and progressive, through the East being defined as primitive, barbaric, and despotic. n41 Similar discourses sustain American national identity. American Orientalism references North Africa, the Middle East, and Turkey, as well as East Asia. Collectively, and often indistinguishably, they [\*1587] function as the "East" to America's democratic and progressive "West." September 11 gave this discourse new currency in relation to what are depicted as the barbaric regions of the world that spawn terror. n42

#### C) Multiculturalism DA – Requiring a hypothical plan leaves in tact status quo Islamophobic hierarchies through the myth of the “racially blind society”

Grosfoguel and Mielants 6 (Ramón Grosfoguel, University of California - Berkeley, and Eric Mielants, Fairfield University, The Long-Durée Entanglement Between Islamophobia and Racism in the Modern/Colonial Capitalist/Patriarchal World-System: An Introduction, Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge: Vol. 5:Iss. 1, Article 2., 23 September 2006, http://scholarworks.umb.edu/humanarchitecture/vol5/iss1/2, da 10-12-13) PC

It does not matter if the Western domestic political system is the British multicultural model or the French Republican model— neither is working. Unable to overcome the problem of racial discrimination, racism becomes a corrosive process that ends up destroying the abstract ideals of each model. In the case of the Anglo-American world, multiculturalism and diversity operate to conceal white supremacy. The racial minorities are allowed to celebrate their history, traditions and identity as long as they leave intact the white supremacy’s racial/ethnic hierarchy of the status quo. The dominant system in the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States is an institutionalized and concealed “white affirmative action” that benefits whites on a daily basis and at all levels of social existence. It is so powerful that it has become normalized to the point of not being stated as such.¶ In the French Republican model, the formal system of equality operates with an institutionalized and normalized “communautarisme masculin blanc.” If racial/gender/ sexual minorities protest discrimination, they are accused by the “communautaristes masculin blanc” in power to be acting as “communautaristes” as if the elites in power were racial and gender blind/neutral, behaving towards everybody with a “universal principle of equality.” White supremacy in France operates within the myth of a “racially blind society.” “Racially-blind racism” is institutionalized and normalized in France to the point that makes discriminatory “communautarisme masculin blanc” invisible.¶ Islamophobia is a case in point. The so-called neutrality of the West is contradicted when Muslims affirm their practices and identities in the public sphere and when they make claims of discrimination in education or the labor market as citizens with equal rights within Western states. The veil law in France against Muslim women’s use of the veil in public institutions or the incarceration without due procedure and torture of thousands of Muslims in the United States are just recent instances in a long list of grievances.¶ At a world level, Islamophobia has been the dominant discourse used in the post-civil rights and post-independence era of dominant cultural racist discourses against Arabs. The events of 9/11 escalated anti-Arab racism through an Islamophobic hysteria all over the world, specifically among the dominant elites of the United States and Israel. The latter is not surprising given U.S. and Israeli representation of Palestinians, Arabs and Islamic people in general as terrorists decades before 9/11 (Said 1979, 1981). The responsibility of U.S. foreign policy is never linked to the tragic events of 9/11. The U.S. Cold War against the “Evil Empire” in Afghanistan during the 1980s financed, supported and created a global network of Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups, then known as “Freedom Fighters,” that came back to haunt them on 9/11 (Johnson 2006). The U.S. was complicit in Osama Bin-Laden’s and Al Qaeda’s operations as part of the CIA’s global/imperial designs and operations against the Soviet Union back in the 1980s. However, it is easier to blame Arab people and use racist Islamophobic arguments rather than to critically examine U.S. foreign policy over the past 50 years. The same applies to Saddam Hussein, who was a loyal U.S. ally and fought dirty wars, supported by the CIA, against Iran following U.S. imperial/global designs during the 1980s. Yet he was later declared a U.S. enemy and falsely accused by the U.S. elites to have links to Al Qaeda in order to justify a long-planned war against Iraq (Risen 2006).¶ It is symptomatic that in most Western countries, Arabs are still perceived as if they were “the majority of Muslims in the world” even though they are only 1/5 of the world’s total Muslim population. This is related to Western global/imperial designs for domination and exploitation of oil in the Middle East and Arabs’ resistance against it (Harvey 2003). The long term exaggerated image of Arabs as terrorists and violent in Western media (newspapers, movies, radio, television, etc.) has been fundamental to the new wave of anti-Arab racism linked to an Islamophobic discourse through cultural racism before and after 9/11 (Said 1981). It is not accidental that Anti-Arab racism accounts for most Islamophobia in the West. Even Muslims from South Asia and African origin living in the West get part of the heat of the anti-Arab racism, especially in the United States (Salaita 2006).

#### 10) We are a logical pre-requisite. Legal reformism and restrictions on Presidential War Powers will always fail, because they fail to address the construction of the Other and antithetical to the American sense of identity. That’s 1AC Volpp.

#### 11) Reasonability – competing interpretations is an arbitrary race to the bottom. The neg will just keep artificially moving the goal posts to exclude the aff to preclude the education we offer. Potential abuse is not a voter.

### China 2AC

#### Clash of civs makes HR push inevitable – we solve

#### No internal link between cred on Guantanamo and cred on China

#### Their evidence concludes that we will capitalize on the next instance of human rights violations

#### China threat is extremely exaggerated and their authors prefer fear to facts.

Pan 4 (“The ‘China Threat’ in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics”, Political Science, Department of Political Science at Australian National University, Alternatives, June-July) RCM

Likewise, with the goal of absolute security for the United States in mind, Richard Betts and Thomas Christensen argue: The truth is that China can pose a grave problem even if it does not become a military power on the American model, does not intend to commit aggression, integrates into a global economy, and liberalizes politically. Similarly, the United States could face a dangerous conflict over Taiwan even if it turns out that Beijing lacks the capacity to conquer the island. . . . This is true because of geography; because of America's reliance on alliances to project power; and because of China's capacity to harm U.S. forces, U.S. regional allies, and the American homeland, even while losing a war in the technical, military sense.' By now, it seems clear that neither China's capabilities nor intentions really matter. Rather, almost by its mere geographical existence, China has been qualified as an absolute strategic “other,” a discursive construct from which it cannot escape. Because of this, “China” in U.S. IR discourse has been objectified and deprived of its own subjectivity and exists mainly in and/or the U.S. self. Little wonder that for many U.S. China specialists, China becomes merely a “national security concern” for the United States, with the “severe disproportion between the keen attention to China as a security concern and the intractable neglect of China's [own] security concerns in the current debate.” At this point, at issue here is no longer whether the “China threat” argument is true or false, but is rather its reflection of a shared positivist mentality among mainstream China experts that they know China better than do the Chinese themselves. “We” alone can know for sure that they consider “us” their enemy and thus pose a menace to “us.” Such an account of China, in many ways, strongly seems to resemble Orientalists' problematic distinction between the West and the Orient. Like orientalism, the U.S. construction of the Chinese “other” does not require that China acknowledge the validity of that dichotomous construction. Indeed, as Edward Said point out, “It is enough for 'us' to set up these distinctions in our own minds; [and] 'they' become 'they' accordingly. “64 It may be the case that there is nothing inherently wrong with perceiving others through one's own subjective lens. Yet, what is problematic with mainstream U.S. China watchers is that they refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy of the inherent fluidity of Chinese identity and subjectivity and try instead to fix its ambiguity as absolute difference from “us,” a kind of certainty that denotes nothing but otherness and threats. As a result, it becomes difficult to find a legitimate space for alternative ways of understanding an inherently volatile, amorphous China or to recognize that China's future trajectory in global politics is contingent essentially on how “we” in the United States and the West in general want to see it as well as on how the Chinese choose to shape it. Indeed, discourses of “us” and “them” are always closely linked to how “we” as “what we are” deal with “them” as “what they are” in the practical realm.

#### No US China war

Keck 13 (Zachary Keck is Assistant Editor of The Diplomat. He has previously served as a Deputy Editor for E-IR and as an Editorial Assistant for The Diplomat. Zach has published in various outlets such as Foreign Policy, The National Interest, The Atlantic, Foreign Affairs, and World Politics Review., 7/12/2013, "Why China and the US (Probably) Won't Go to War", thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2013/07/12/why-china-and-the-us-probably-wont-go-to-war/)

¶ But while trade cannot be relied upon to keep the peace, a U.S.-China war is virtually unthinkable because of two other factors: nuclear weapons and geography.¶ ¶ The fact that both the U.S. and China have nuclear weapons is the most obvious reasons why they won’t clash, even if they remain fiercely competitive. This is because war is the continuation of politics by other means, and nuclear weapons make war extremely bad politics. Put differently, war is fought in pursuit of policy ends, which cannot be achieved through a total war between nuclear-armed states.¶ ¶ This is not only because of nuclear weapons destructive power. As Thomas Schelling outlined brilliantly, nuclear weapons have not actually increased humans destructive capabilities. In fact, there is evidence to suggest that wars between nomads usually ended with the victors slaughtering all of the individuals on the losing side, because of the economics of holding slaves in nomadic “societies.” ¶ ¶ What makes nuclear weapons different, then, is not just their destructive power but also the certainty and immediacy of it. While extremely ambitious or desperate leaders can delude themselves into believing they can prevail in a conventional conflict with a stronger adversary because of any number of factors—superior will, superior doctrine, the weather etc.— none of this matters in nuclear war. With nuclear weapons, countries don’t have to prevail on the battlefield or defeat an opposing army to destroy an entire country, and since there are no adequate defenses for a large-scale nuclear attack, every leader can be absolute certain that most of their country can be destroyed in short-order in the event of a total conflict.¶ ¶ Since no policy goal is worth this level of sacrifice, the only possible way for an all-out conflict to ensue is for a miscalculation of some sort to occur. Most of these can and should be dealt by Chinese and the U.S. leaders holding regularly senior level dialogues like the ones of the past month, in which frank and direct talk about redlines are discussed.¶ ¶ These can and should be supplemented with clear and open communication channels, which can be especially useful when unexpected crises arise, like an exchange of fire between low-level naval officers in the increasingly crowded waters in the region. While this possibility is real and frightening, it’s hard to imagine a plausible scenario where it leads to a nuclear exchange between China and the United States. After all, at each stage of the crisis leaders know that if it is not properly contained, a nuclear war could ensue, and the complete destruction of a leader’s country is a more frightening possibility than losing credibility among hawkish elements of society. In any case, measured means of retaliation would be available to the party wronged, and behind-the-scenes diplomacy could help facilitate the process of finding mutually acceptable retaliatory measures.¶ ¶ Geography is the less appreciated factor that will mitigate the chances of a U.S.-China war, but it could be nearly as important as nuclear weapons. Indeed, geography has a history of allowing countries to avoid the Thucydides Trap, and works against a U.S.-China war in a couple of ways.¶ ¶ First, both the United States and China are immensely large countries—according to the Central Intelligence Agency, the U.S. and China are the third and fourth largest countries in the world by area, at 9,826,675 and 9,596,961 square km respectively. They also have difficult topographical features and complex populations. As such, they are virtually unconquerable by another power.¶ ¶ This is an important point and differentiates the current strategic environment from historical cases where power transitions led to war. For example, in Europe where many of the historical cases derive from, each state genuinely had to worry that the other side could increase their power capabilities to such a degree that they could credibly threaten the other side’s national survival. Neither China nor the U.S. has to realistically entertain such fears, and this will lessen their insecurity and therefore the security dilemma they operate within.¶ ¶ Besides being immensely large countries, China and the U.S. are also separated by the Pacific Ocean, which will also weaken their sense of insecurity and threat perception towards one another. In many of the violent power transitions of the past, starting with Sparta and Athens but also including the European ones, the rival states were located in close proximity to one another. By contrast, when great power conflict has been avoided, the states have often had considerable distance between them, as was the case for the U.S. and British power transition and the peaceful end to the Cold War. The reason is simple and similar to the one above: the difficulty of projecting power across large distances—particularly bodies of waters— reduces each side’s concern that the other will threaten its national survival and most important strategic interests.¶ ¶ True, the U.S. operates extensively in China’s backyard, and maintains numerous alliances and partnerships with Beijing’s neighbors. This undeniably heightens the risk of conflict. At the same time, the British were active throughout the Western Hemisphere, most notably in Canada, and the Americans maintained a robust alliance system in Western Europe throughout the Cold War. Even with the U.S. presence in Asia, then, the fact that the Chinese and American homelands are separated by the largest body of water in the world is enormously important in reducing their conflict potential, if history is any guide at least.¶ ¶ Thus, while every effort should be made to avoid a U.S.-China war, it is nearly unthinkable one will occur.

### 2AC Terrorism DA

#### Case outweighs - Dehumanization comes first – no chance for regeneration of VTL, because their discourse has created an ethic that tells Muslims their lives do not matter – that’s 1AC Butler.

#### Their discourse about terrorist threats is an opaque rouse used by elites to distract policymakers from addressing ongoing structural violence. A) The prop up jingoistic patriotism and Islamophobia as a means of stifling dissent. B) Discussion of catastrophic terrorism desensitizes us from ongoing structural violence. That’s 1AC Bryan.

#### Structural violence locks in social and environmental tension---culminates in extinction and makes war inevitable

Tamás Szentes 8, Professor Emeritus at the Corvinus University of Budapest. “Globalisation and prospects of the world society” 4/22/08 http://www.eadi.org/fileadmin/Documents/Events/exco/Glob.\_\_\_prospects\_-\_jav..pdf

It’ s a common place that human society can survive and develop only in a lasting real peace. Without peace countries cannot develop. Although since 1945 there has been no world war, but --numerous local wars took place, --terrorism has spread all over the world, undermining security even in the most developed and powerful countries, --arms race and militarisation have not ended with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, but escalated and continued, extending also to weapons of mass destruction and misusing enormous resources badly needed for development, --many “invisible wars” are suffered by the poor and oppressed people, manifested in mass misery, poverty, unemployment, homelessness, starvation and malnutrition, epidemics and poor health conditions, exploitation and oppression, racial and other discrimination, physical terror, organised injustice, disguised forms of violence, the denial or regular infringement of the democratic rights of citizens, women, youth, ethnic or religious minorities, etc., and last but not least, in the degradation of human environment, which means that --the “war against Nature”, i.e. the disturbance of ecological balance, wasteful management of natural resources, and large-scale pollution of our environment, is still going on, causing also losses and fatal dangers for human life. Behind global terrorism and “invisible wars” we find striking international and intrasociety inequities and distorted development patterns , which tend to generate social as well as international tensions, thus paving the way for unrest and “visible” wars. It is a commonplace now that peace is not merely the absence of war. The prerequisites of a lasting peace between and within societies involve not only - though, of course, necessarily - demilitarisation, but also a systematic and gradual elimination of the roots of violence, of the causes of “invisible wars”, of the structural and institutional bases of large-scale international and intra-society inequalities, exploitation and oppression. Peace requires a process of social and national emancipation, a progressive, democratic transformation of societies and the world bringing about equal rights and opportunities for all people, sovereign participation and mutually advantageous co-operation among nations. It further requires a pluralistic democracy on global level with an appropriate system of proportional representation of the world society, articulation of diverse interests and their peaceful reconciliation, by non-violent conflict management, and thus also a global governance with a really global institutional system. Under the contemporary conditions of accelerating globalisation and deepening global interdependencies in our world, peace is indivisible in both time and space. It cannot exist if reduced to a period only after or before war, and cannot be safeguarded in one part of the world when some others suffer visible or invisible wars. Thus, peace requires, indeed, a new, demilitarised and democratic world order, which can provide equal opportunities for sustainable development. “Sustainability of development” (both on national and world level) is often interpreted as an issue of environmental protection only and reduced to the need for preserving the ecological balance and delivering the next generations not a destroyed Nature with overexhausted resources and polluted environment. However, no ecological balance can be ensured, unless the deep international development gap and intra-society inequalities are substantially reduced. Owing to global interdependencies there may exist hardly any “zero-sum-games”, in which one can gain at the expense of others, but, instead, the “negative-sum-games” tend to predominate, in which everybody must suffer, later or sooner, directly or indirectly, losses. Therefore, **the** actual **question is not about “sustainability of development” but** rather about the “sustainability of human life”, i.e. survival of [hu]mankind – because of ecological imbalance and globalised terrorism. When Professor Louk de la Rive Box was the president of EADI, one day we had an exchange of views on the state and future of development studies. We agreed that development studies are not any more restricted to the case of underdeveloped countries, as the developed ones (as well as the former “socialist” countries) are also facing development problems, such as those of structural and institutional (and even system-) transformation, requirements of changes in development patterns, and concerns about natural environment. While all these are true, today I would dare say that besides (or even instead of) “development studies” we must speak about and make “survival studies”. While the monetary, financial, and debt crises are cyclical, we live in an almost permanent crisis of the world society, which is multidimensional in nature, involving not only economic but also socio-psychological, behavioural, cultural and political aspects. The narrow-minded, election-oriented, selfish behaviour motivated by thirst for power and wealth, which still characterise the political leadership almost all over the world, paves the way for the final, last catastrophe. One cannot doubt, of course, that great many positive historical changes have also taken place in the world in the last century. Such as decolonisation, transformation of socio-economic systems, democratisation of political life in some former fascist or authoritarian states, institutionalisation of welfare policies in several countries, rise of international organisations and new forums for negotiations, conflict management and cooperation, institutionalisation of international assistance programmes by multilateral agencies, codification of human rights, and rights of sovereignty and democracy also on international level, collapse of the militarised Soviet bloc and system-change3 in the countries concerned, the end of cold war, etc., to mention only a few. Nevertheless, the crisis of the world society has extended and deepened, approaching to a point of bifurcation that necessarily puts an end to the present tendencies, either by the final catastrophe or a common solution. Under the circumstances provided by rapidly progressing science and technological revolutions, human society cannot survive unless such profound intra-society and international inequalities prevailing today are soon eliminated. Like a single spacecraft, the Earth can no longer afford to have a 'crew' divided into **two parts: the rich, privileged**, wellfed, well-educated, **on the one hand, and the poor, deprived**, starving, sick and uneducated, **on the other**. Dangerous 'zero-sum-games' (which mostly prove to be “negative-sum-games”) can hardly be played any more by visible or invisible wars in the world society. Because of global interdependencies, the apparent winner becomes also a loser. The real choice for the world society is between negative- and positive-sum-games: i.e. between, on the one hand, continuation of visible and “invisible wars”, as long as this is possible at all, and, on the other, transformation of the world order by demilitarisation and democratization. No ideological or terminological camouflage can conceal this real dilemma any more, which is to be faced not in the distant future, by the next generations, but in the coming years, because of global terrorism soon having nuclear and other mass destructive weapons, and also due to irreversible changes in natural environment.

#### <No uniqueness for their case turn – Islamophobia and detention exist now>

#### <Cross-apply the> Epistemology DA – their authors’ threat construction and self-reflection rely on the point-zero perspective. This universalizes Western epistemology linking Islam with terrorism, justifying indefinite detention and creating bad education – independent reason to reject the team even if they don’t go for this argument. That’s 1AC Grosfoguel and Mielants.

#### Detention’s reliance on racial profiling makes it ineffective – the squo relies on racialized ways of looking, which causes enforcement to center on targeting Muslim populations instead of reducing violence. That’s 1AC Butler.

#### Terrorism studies fail – lack of primary research, recycled data, lack of theoretical backing and the focus on a problem solving approach.

Gunning, Reader in Middle East Politics, and Conflict Studies in the School of Government and International Affairs at Durham University, ‘7

[Jeroen, “A Case for Critical Terrorism Studies?”, Government and Opposition, Volume 42, Issue 3, pages 363–393, Summer 2007, RSR]

Reviews of ‘terrorism studies’– or ‘terrorism research’ for those who dispute that such a field exists8– typically revolve around four sets of criticisms. One is the observed lack of primary research and the recycling of data. In their seminal review of the field, Schmid and Jongman observed in 1988 that ‘there are probably few areas in the social science literature on which so much is written on the basis of so little research’, concluding that ‘as much as 80 per cent of the literature is not research-based in any rigorous sense; instead, it is too often narrative, condemnatory, and prescriptive’.9 In 2004, Silke noted, on the basis of an analysis of articles published between 1995 and 1999 in the two key journals –Terrorism and Political Violence and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism– that ‘over 80 per cent of all research on “terrorism” is based either solely or primarily on data gathered from books, journals, the media or media-derived databases, or other published documents’.10 In other words, it is predominantly based on ‘secondary data analysis’ and includes few primary sources or new data (for example, only 13 per cent of the articles drew substantially on personal interviews).11 Or, as Silke commented in 2006, much of the research is little more than a glorified literature review.12 Although Silke's conclusion is somewhat undermined by his not differentiating between secondary documents and primary documents produced by insurgent groups (which appear to be used more frequently than personal interviews),13 his overall observation that ‘terrorism research’ relies heavily on recycled data remains valid. Another critique is that research tends to focus on a ‘short-term, immediate assessment’ of ‘current or imminent threats’ as defined by state elites, without placing them in their wider social and historical context or questioning to what extent the state or the status quo have contributed to these ‘imminent threats’.14 Local context and history are largely ignored and ‘terrorism’ is too often treated, in Ranstorp's words, ‘generically and with a “one-size-fits-all formula” ’.15 Very few articles focus on historical cases of ‘terrorism’.16 Fieldwork, moreover, is rare. Or, quoting O’Leary and Silke, ‘much of what is written about terrorism . . . is written by people who have never met a terrorist, or have never actually spent significant time on the ground in the areas most affected by conflict’ (which is in part a reflection of the crisis in area and language studies).17 Conceptual discussions are similarly observed to be largely deficient. In the words of social movement theorist Sidney Tarrow,‘terrorism studies’ has been ‘largely innocent of theoretical apparatus’.18 Silke observed in 2004 that less than 2 per cent of articles published during the 1990s in the two core ‘terrorism’ journals dealt with conceptual issues, and most of these concerned the definition of ‘terrorism’.19 Compared to other fields, Silke considers ‘terrorism studies’ to be ‘extremely applied’, and insufficiently questioning of the theoretical or ideological assumptions informing its research (although – as Horgan observes – since conceptual discussions are more likely to occur in books than in articles, Silke's sample may not be wholly representative).20 Most articles do not explicitly draw on (cognate) theories to illuminate their data, although recent output has begun to be more theoretically developed.21 Few articles consider the political agenda behind the use of the word ‘terrorism’ or whether eradication through coercive means without political transformation is the most effective way forward (although here too, recent output has been more critical).22 A related critique is that ‘terrorism studies’ tends to accept uncritically the framing of the ‘terrorism problem’ by the state. Herman and O'Sullivan observed this in their tirade against the ‘terrorism industry’, as did George, equally stridently, in his article ‘The Discipline of Terrorology’.23 But even ‘engaged’ critics such as Silke, O’Leary, Crelinsten and Schmid and Jongman argue that ‘terrorism studies’ often suffers from state bias. Schmid and Jongman observed in exasperation that much of the field's output resembled ‘counterinsurgency masquerading as political science’.24 Crelinsten, Silke and O’Leary were more forgiving, simply observing that, as a result of government-funding opportunities and affinities between state institutions and researchers, research often displayed an uncritical orientation towards state perspectives and concerns.25 The effect of this orientation can be seen in both methodology and in the types of questions that remain unasked. One of the reasons so few articles draw on personal interviews or attempt to understand those using terroristic methods subjectively, through empathy and placing oneself in their shoes,26 is arguably this predisposition towards the status quo. This same orientation makes it difficult to ask questions about the extent to which counter-terrorism policies perpetuate the ‘terrorist threat’ or whether political transformation may be more effective than mere coercive force aimed at eradication. Researchers may be too embedded socially and culturally in an entity under ‘attack’ from ‘others’ to engage these ‘others’ subjectively or contemplate radically different counter-terrorism tactics. Existing research foci and practices may also prevent researchers from doing so by acting as disciplining agents.27 Most of those who critique ‘terrorism studies’ trace the field's shortcomings back either to problems inherent in the study of clandestine violence, whether carried out by state actors or non-state actors, or to ideological predispositions and issues related to funding (the apparent lack thereof or too close an association with government bodies).28 A third cause, identified by, among others, Silke, O’Leary and Merari, is that few scholars stay in the field of ‘terrorism studies’. Silke found that over 80 per cent of articles published in the two core ‘terrorism’ journals during the 1990s were written by ‘one-timers’. It is this lack of commitment to the field, and the transitory nature of many of its contributors, that Silke identifies as one of the reasons that the field has struggled ‘to establish a solid conceptual framework’.29 It is arguably also a reason for the relative lack of the kind of conceptual and critical debates that are necessary for a field to become more rigorous, and methodologically and conceptually innovative. Each of these critiques goes some way to explain the shortcomings in ‘terrorism research’, although the argument that funding is not available for projects critical of the status quo is perhaps overstated.30 It will always be difficult to obtain reliable data on clandestine violence, so that scholars will inevitably be tempted to draw heavily on secondary sources or build elaborate theories on very little, and often dubious, information.31 Equally, given prevailing power structures, the embeddednes of researchers within them, and the shock that terroristic tactics typically seek to induce, it will arguably always be tempting to demonize the ‘terrorist other’. However, what most of the critiques overlook is the crucial fact that, beyond these inherent difficulties, many of the observed shortcomings can be traced back to the dominance in ‘terrorism research’ of what Robert Cox famously called a ‘problem-solving’ approach: one that ‘takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action’.32

#### We solve better –

#### Subpoint A – root cause – terrorism is a result of the cooptation of Orientalist narratives that cause individuals to adopt a belief behind the necessity of conflict with the west. That’s 1AC Bottici and Challand.

#### Subpoint B – self fulfilling prophecy – their scholars presume the West knows best, justifying the Iraq war and financing Israeli militarism, which solidified the notion of cultural conflict. <Flawed experts provided assistance to Al Qaeda in the 1980s to resist the Soviet invasion, ignoring the disagreements the organization had with the United States and causing more attacks.> That’s 1AC Bryan, and 1AC Bottici and Challand.

Indefinite Detention doesn’t solve terrorism

Roberts, Associate Professor of Philosophy at East Carolina University, ‘11

[Rodney, “Utilitarianism and the Morality of Indefinite Detention”, Criminal Justice Ethics, Vol. 30, No. 1, RSR]

Finally, ‘‘there is no evidence that preventive detention works. Comparative studies of terrorism stretching back more than 20 years have concluded that draconian measures\* such as prolonged detention without trial\*are not proven to reduce violence, and can actually be counterproductive.’’ 30 Since it may contribute to the ‘‘underlying factors [that] are fueling the spread of the jihadist movement,’’ namely, ‘‘injustice and fear of Western domination, leading to anger, humiliation, and a sense of powerlessness,’’ there is a sense in which indefinite detention can be selfdefeating\*it may increase the likelihood of future attacks.31

#### No WMD terrorism – Experts go Aff

Fay, PhD student in the history department at Temple University, ‘13

[Matt, has a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from St. Xavier University and a Master’s in International Relations and Conflict Resolution with a minor in Transnational Security Studies from American Military University, 7/18/13, “The Ever-Shrinking Odds of Nuclear Terrorism”, webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:HoItCUNhbgUJ:hegemonicobsessions.com/%3Fp%3D902+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-a]

For over a decade now, one of the most oft-repeated threats raised by policymakers—the one that in many ways justified the invasion of Iraq—has been that of nuclear terrorism. Officials in both the Bush and Obama administrations, including the presidents themselves, have raised the specter of the atomic terrorist. But beyond mere rhetoric, how likely is a nuclear terrorist attack really?¶ While pessimistic estimates about America’s ability to avoid a nuclear terrorist attack became something of a cottage industry following the September 11th attacks, a number of scholars in recent years have pushed back against this trend. Frank Gavin has put post-9/11 fears of nuclear terrorism into historical context (pdf) and argued against the prevailing alarmism. Anne Stenersen of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment has challenged the idea that al Qaeda was ever bound and determined to acquire a nuclear weapon. John Mueller ridiculed the notion of nuclear terrorism in his book Atomic Obsessions and highlighted the numerous steps a terrorist group would need to take—all of which would have to be successful—in order to procure, deliver, and detonate an atomic weapon. And in his excellent, and exceedingly even-handed, treatment of the subject, On Nuclear Terrorism, Michael Levi outlined the difficulties terrorists would face building their own nuclear weapon and discussed how a “system of systems” could be developed to interdict potential materials smuggled into the United States—citing a “Murphy’s law of nuclear terrorism” that could possibly dissuade terrorists from even trying in the first place.¶ But what about the possibility that a rogue state could transfer a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group? That was ostensibly why the United States deposed Saddam Hussein’s regime: fear he would turnover one of his hypothetical nuclear weapons for al Qaeda to use.¶ Enter into this discussion Keir Lieber and Daryl Press and their article in the most recent edition of International Security, “Why States Won’t Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists.” Lieber and Press have been writing on nuclear issues for just shy of a decade—doing innovative, if controversial work on American nuclear strategy. However, I believe this is their first venture into the debate over nuclear terrorism. And while others, such as Mueller, have argued that states are unlikely to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists, this article is the first to tackle the subject with an empirical analysis.¶ The title of their article nicely sums up their argument: states will not turn over nuclear weapons terrorists. To back up this claim, Lieber and Press attack the idea that states will transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists because terrorists operate of absent a “return address.” Based on an examination of attribution following conventional terrorist attacks, the authors conclude:¶ [N]either a terror group nor a state sponsor would remain anonymous after a nuclear attack. We draw this conclusion on the basis of four main findings. First, data on a decade of terrorist incidents reveal a strong positive relationship between the number of fatalities caused in a terror attack and the likelihood of attribution. Roughly three-quarters of the attacks that kill 100 people or more are traced back to the perpetrators. Second, attribution rates are far higher for attacks on the U.S. homeland or the territory of a major U.S. ally—97 percent (thirty-six of thirty-seven) for incidents that killed ten or more people. Third, tracing culpability from a guilty terrorist group back to its state sponsor is not likely to be difficult: few countries sponsor terrorism; few terrorist groups have state sponsors; each sponsor terrorist group has few sponsors (typically one); and only one country that sponsors terrorism, has nuclear weapons or enough fissile material to manufacture a weapon. In sum, attribution of nuclear terror incidents would be easier than is typically suggested, and passing weapons to terrorists would not offer countries escape from the constraints of deterrence.¶ From this analysis, Lieber and Press draw two major implications for U.S. foreign policy: claims that it is impossible to attribute nuclear terrorism to particular groups or potential states sponsors undermines deterrence; and fear of states transferring nuclear weapons to terrorist groups, by itself, does not justify extreme measures to prevent nuclear proliferation.¶ This is a key point. While there are other reasons nuclear proliferation is undesirable, fears of nuclear terrorism have been used to justify a wide-range of policies—up to, and including, military action. Put in its proper perspective however—given the difficulty in constructing and transporting a nuclear device and the improbability of state transfer—nuclear terrorism hardly warrants the type of exertions many alarmist assessments indicate it should.

#### Their description of the terrorist threat is over-exaggerated- these impact claims not only undermine the credibility of all terror scholarship, but are used to legitimize wars, torture, targeted killings, and elimination of civil liberties.

Jackson, Director at the National Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, 8

(Richard, 2/14/08, “The Study of Terrorism after 11 September 2001: Problems, Challenges and Future Developments,” Political Studies Review, volume: 7, p. 171.184, CPO)

The vast majority of terrorism studies are predicated on, or at the very least, take for granted, the notion that terrorism represents one of the main threats facing states today. This is certainly the case with several of the books under review here (see Bar, 2006; Nesi, 2006; Sloan, 2006). Some terrorism scholars go so far as to suggest that terrorism is the premier international security threat today (Sageman, 2004, p. vii), and that it threatens the existence of the entire international system (Mendelsohn, 2005, p. 45).¶ Two aspects in particular are troubling about this situation. First, it is disappointing from a scholarly perspective that so few terrorism scholars make the effort to question or investigate the evidentiary basis of this popular narrative. If they did, they would note that there has in fact been a decrease in terrorist incidents over the past two decades, global terrorism-related deaths average no more than a few hundred per year and, in contrast to the tens of millions killed by disease, small arms, state repression, famine, automobile accidents, global warming, crime, natural disasters and numerous other phenomena, terrorism ranks extremely low as a risk to personal safety (Goodin, 2006, pp. 111–23; see also Jackson, 2007b; Mueller, 2005).They would also note that the preponderance of evidence suggests that the likelihood of terrorists deploying weapons of mass destruction is minuscule, given the not insignificant technical, strategic and political obstacles to their use (see Jenkins, 1998; Mueller, 2006; Sprinzak, 1998); that no state or society has ever been existentially threatened by acts of terrorism alone; and it is a gross simplification to assume that contemporary ‘religious terrorists’ are less discriminating than the ideological and nationalist terrorists of yesteryear (Jackson, 2007a). Refusing to reproduce or reinforce inaccurate and alarmist depictions of the current threat facing Western countries would go a long way to restoring academic credibility in the field – as well as providing a much needed degree of perspective to public debates and political deliberations.¶ Second, it is especially troubling that terrorism scholars lack any awareness of the ways in which the massively over-exaggerated terrorist threat (which they have in part helped to authoritatively construct as ‘real’) is used politically to legitimise a range of external and domestic political projects, many of which are of dubious efficacy or legitimacy. For example, the purported existential and ubiquitous threat posed by contemporary ‘Islamist’ terrorists has been used to justify foreign invasion and war, the use of torture, extraordinary rendition, the Guantánamo detentions, extra-judicial assassinations or ‘targeted killings’, military assistance to non-democratic regimes, domestic surveillance, shoot-to-kill policies, identity cards, expansion of the security services, increased military spending and the like (Jackson, 2007b)

#### The affective realities of threats justify preemptive action. This ensures a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Massumi, Professor of Critical Empiricism at the European Graduate School, ‘10

[Brian, “THE FUTURE BIRTH OF THE AFFECTIVE FACT: The Political Ontology of Threat”, The Affect Theory Reader, Duke University Press, 2010, RSR]

The felt reality of threat legitimates preemptive action, once and for all. Any action taken to preempt a threat from emerging into a clear and present danger is legitimated by the affective fact of fear, actual facts aside.> Preemptive action will always have been right. This circularity is not a failure of logic. It is a different logic, operating on the same affective register as threat's self-causing. The logic of affectively legitimated fact is in the conditional: Bush did what he did because Saddam could have done what he didn't do. Bush's argument doesn't really do justice to the logic of preemption. Saddam didn't actually even have the "capacity;' and that poses no problem for preemptive logic, which is based on a double conditional. "The Pentagon neocons argued that the CIA overemphasized what Saddam could do instead of stressing what he would do if he could" (Dorrien 2004> 186). Bush was being modest in a CIA kind of way. From the prevailing neoconservative perspective, he was understating why he was right. He was right even though Saddam did not have the capacity, because Saddam "would have if he could have." The case remains open. At any moment in the future, he could have acquired the means, and as soon as he could, he would. Would have, could have: double conditional Present threat is logically recessive, in a step-by-step regress from the certainty of actual fact The actual fact would have been: Saddam Hussein has WMD. The first step back from that is: he had the capacity to have WMD. The next step is: he didn't have the capacity, but he still would have if he could have. The recessive assertion that he "would have" is based on an assumption about character and intent that cannot be empirically grounded with any certainty. But it is proffered with certainty. It carries a certainty, underivable from actual fact, which it owes to the affective fact of the matter. The felt reality of the threat is so superlatively real that it translates into a felt certainty about the world, even in the absence of other grounding for it in the observable world. The assertion has the felt certainty of a "gut feeling." Gut feeling was proudly and publicly embraced by Bush as his peak decisionmaking process in the lead-up to the war in Iraq and beyond.3 Preemption's logical regress from actual fact makes for a disjointedness between its legitimating discourse and the objective content of the present context, which its affirmations ostensibly reference. Its receding from actual fact produces a logical disjunction between the threat and the observable present A logical gap opens in the present through which the reality of threat slips to rejoin its deferral to the future. Through the logical hatch of the double conditional, threat makes a runaround through the present back toward its self-causing futurity. The affect-driven logic of the would-have/could-have is what discursively ensures that the actual facts will always remain an open case, for all preemptive intents and purposes. It is what saves threat from having to materialize as a clear and present danger-or even an emergent danger-in order to command action. The object of preemptive power, according to the explicit doctrine, is "not yet fully emergent threat." The doctrine doesn't say emergent danger-let alone dear and present danger.• And again (and again), when threat strikes it is once and for all. Problem: How can preemptive politics maintain its political legitimacy given that it grounds itself in the actual ungroundedness of affective fact? Would not pointing out the actual facts be enough to make it crumble? Observation: Bush won his reelection. Fast forward: It is one year later, the summer of 2005. For the first time in the polls, more than two years after the invasion, a majority of Americans oppose the war in Iraq. The legitimation of preemptive action-or that particular action at any rate-is faltering. The downturn had begun long after the lack of actual facts behind the decision to invade had become common knowledge. It began with the counteraffective strike that carne with the release and widespread circulation of shocking images of torture at Abu Ghraib.5 It was only then that the lack of actual-factual basis for the invasion began to resonate with a voting public rendered less receptive, for the moment, to the logic of preemption by the affective countercoup of torture graphically revealed. Bush makes a valiant attempt to kick-start the logic of preemption again. He delivers a major radio address to the nation explaining his refusal to withdraw. He deploys an argument that he will continue to use for at least the next two years.• "Some may agree:' he says, "with my decision to remove Saddam Hussein from power, but all of us can agree that the world's terrorists have now made Iraq a central front in the war on terror" (Bush 2005). The presence of terrorist links between AI Qaeda and Saddam Hussein had been the second major argument, behind WMD, originally used to justify the invasion. The Bush administration had already been obliged to withdraw the assertion long before this speech. The fact that AI Qaeda had not been in Iraq at the time of the invasion now becomes the reason it was right to invade. The fact that they are there now just goes to prove that if they could have been there then, they would have. The could-have/would-have logic works both ways. If the threat does not materialize, it still always would have if it could have. If the threat does materialize, then it just goes to show that the future potential for what happened had really been there in the past. In this case, the preemptive action is retroactively legitimated by future actual facts. Bush does not point out that the reason AI Qaeda is now in Iraq is because of the invasion that was mounted to keep it out of Iraq, that the preemptive action actually brought about the result it was meant to fight. Observation: Preemptive action can produce the object toward which its power is applied, and it can do so without contradicting its own logic, and without necessarily undermining its legitimation. Proposition: Because it operates on an affective register and inhabits a nonlinear time operating recursively between the present and the future, preemptive logic is not subject to the same rules of noncontradiction as normative logic, which privileges a linear causality from the past to the present and is reluctant to attribute an effective reality to futurity.

#### The neg results in more terrorism – fails to interrogate the root causes that make terrorism possible in the first place.

Ahmed, Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development (IPRD), ‘12

[Dr. Nafeez Mosaddeq, he has taught at the Department of International Relations, University of Sussex "The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society" Global Change, Peace & Security Volume 23, Issue 3, 2011 Taylor Francis]

Thus, the securitisation of global crisis leads not only to the problematisation of particular religious and ethnic groups in foreign regions of geopolitical interest, but potentially extends this problematisation to any social group which might challenge prevailing global political economic structures across racial, national and class lines. The previous examples illustrate how secur-itisation paradoxically generates insecurity by reifying a process of militarization against social groups that are constructed as external to the prevailing geopolitical and economic order. In other words, the internal reductionism, fragmentation and compartmentalisation that plagues orthodox theory and policy reproduces precisely these characteristics by externalising global crises from one another, externalising states from one another, externalising the inter-state system from its biophysical environment, and externalising new social groups as dangerous 'outsiders\*. Hence, a simple discursive analysis of state militarisation and the construction of new "outsider\* identities is insufficient to understand the causal dynamics driving the process of 'Otherisation'. As Doug Stokes points out, the Western state preoccupation with the ongoing military struggle against international terrorism reveals an underlying 'discursive complex", where representations about terrorism and non-Western populations are premised on 'the construction of stark boundaries\* that 'operate to exclude and include\*. Yet these exclusionary discourses are 'intimately bound up with political and economic processes', such as strategic interests in proliferating military bases in the Middle East, economic interests in control of oil, and the wider political goal of 'maintaining American hegemony\* by dominating a resource-rich region critical for global capitalism.100¶ But even this does not go far enough, for arguably the construction of certain hegemonic discourses is mutually constituted by these geopolitical, strategic and economic interests — exclusionary discourses are politically constituted. New conceptual developments in genocide studies throw further light on this in terms of the concrete socio-political dynamics of securitisation processes. It is now widely recognised, for instance, that the distinguishing criterion of genocide is not the pre-existence of primordial groups, one of which destroys the other on the basis of a preeminence in bureaucratic military-political power. Rather, genocide is the intentional attempt to destroy a particular social group that has been socially constructed as different. As Hinton observes, genocides precisely constitute a process of 'othering\* in which an imagined community becomes reshaped so that previously 'included\* groups become 'ideologically recast' and dehumanised as threatening and dangerous outsiders, be it along ethnic, religious, political or economic lines — eventually legitimising their annihilation.102¶ In other words, genocidal violence is inherently rooted in a prior and ongoing ideological process, whereby exclusionary group categories are innovated, constructed and 'Otherised' in accordance with a specific socio-political programme. The very process of identifying and classifying particular groups as outside the boundaries of an imagined community of 'inclusion\*, justifying exculpatory violence toward them, is itself a political act without which genocide would be impossible.1 3 This recalls Lemkin's recognition that the intention to destroy a group is integrally connected with a wider socio-political project - or colonial project — designed to perpetuate the political, economic, cultural and ideological relations of the perpetrators in the place of that of the victims, by interrupting or eradicating their means of social reproduction. Only by interrogating the dynamic and origins of this programme to uncover the social relations from which that programme derives can the emergence of genocidal intent become explicable.¶ Building on this insight, Semelin demonstrates that the process of exclusionary social group construction invariably derives from political processes emerging from deep-seated sociopolitical crises that undermine the prevailing framework of civil order and social norms; and which can, for one social group, be seemingly resolved by projecting anxieties onto a new 'outsider' group deemed to be somehow responsible for crisis conditions. It is in this context that various forms of mass violence, which may or may not eventually culminate in actual genocide, can become legitimised as contributing to the resolution of crises.105¶ This does not imply that the securitisation of global crises by Western defence agencies is genocidal. Rather, the same essential dynamics of social polarisation and exclusionary group identity formation evident in genocides are highly relevant in understanding the radicalisation processes behind mass violence. This highlights the fundamental connection between social crisis, the breakdown of prevailing norms, the formation of new exclusionary group identities, and the projection of blame for crisis onto a newly constructed 'outsider' group vindicating various forms of violence.¶

#### Their inflated impact claims feed a politics of fear that empowers elites and amplifies the impact of terrorism- only the aff can exorcise the power of their terrorist threat narrative.

Jackson, Director at the National Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, 8

(Richard, 2/14/08, “The Study of Terrorism after 11 September 2001: Problems, Challenges and Future Developments,” Political Studies Review, volume: 7, p. 171.184, CPO)

In contrast to the dominant approach within terrorism studies, two of the featured books in this review – Goodin’s What’s Wrong with Terrorism? and David Altheide’s Terrorism and the Politics of Fear – join a small but growing number of studies that question the accepted knowledge and interrogate the rise and functions of a ‘politics of fear’ as seen in the popular terrorism threat narrative. Goodin, for example, has an excellent chapter in which he dissects and deconstructs the exaggerated claims about the terrorist threat using both statistical evidence that illustrates its extremely low risk to individual safety, as well as arguments about the current nature and processes of risk assessment. He makes a number of insightful and frequently ignored points: given the way people receive messages about risks and dangers, politicians (and academics) ought to know that their warnings about terrorism and weapons of mass destruction will be received in an ‘alarmist’ way (Goodin, 2006, p. 112); there are some particular irrationalities in risk assessments of terrorism, in part due to psychological processes, but also because of the way the terrorist threat is constructed by the media (pp. 123–36); the argument that terrorism would be much worse if not for all the government warnings lacks credibility given the evidence (p. 122); arguments that terrorists are likely to employ weapons of mass destruction are not entirely convincing for reasons of rational self-interest and practical obstacles (pp. 136–42); and applying the precautionary principle to the terrorist threat results in a number of absurdities and is a costly waste of scarce resources (pp. 142–55).¶ Altheide’s highly stimulating and informative book takes a slightly different approach in that it focuses on the social construction of the terrorist threat and the political economy of its continual reproduction – although he does pointedly note that American citizens are healthier, safer and live more predictable lives than at any other time in history but are also more anxious about the dangers of crime and terrorism than ever before (Altheide, 2006, p. 73).He attributes this extraordinary reality–perception gap to a dominant ‘politics of fear’ in American society. He describes this as a process by which the media uses fear to construct news and popular culture, political elites manipulate these fears to enable social control and achieve political goals, and various economic and social interests profit materially from the production of fear (pp. 1–2). Importantly, he argues that social fear does not occur naturally, but is deliberately constructed and managed by political actors to promote their own partisan goals (p. 18), as well as broader social goals like the construction of national identity (p. 89).Although Altheide does not make clear whether this process is initially driven by the media or by political elites, it is nonetheless the case that the media’s perpetuation of fear encourages politicians to frame their messages in similar ways as a means of generating publicity (p. 16).¶ What becomes clear from Altheide’s incisive analysis is that there are powerful systemic forces that sustain the politics of fear and its associated counter-terrorism industry through the generation of vast profits, increased prestige and careerism. Apart from the obvious beneficiaries in the Homeland Security sector, the military sector and the military– industrial and military–media complexes, other actors with a vested interest in the terrorism threat narrative include, among many others: pharmaceutical companies contracted to supply vaccines and decontamination suits; private security firms that provide airport security services; local councils and politicians who can draw upon funding for surveillance equipment; scientists, academics and researchers drawing upon research funding for antiterrorism projects; and journalists, commentators and ‘terrorism experts’ who build prestigious careers on the back of dire warnings of impending attack. In particular, Altheide highlights some of the ways in which the academy in America has been co-opted into the broader counter-terrorism project in ways strikingly reminiscent of the Cold War (Altheide, 2006, pp. 34–7).¶ What these two books starkly highlight is that terrorists, the media and politicians make gain from the production and manipulation of the public’s fear of sudden, unpredictable political violence, and that from this perspective at least there is a symbiotic relationship – and perhaps a form of unconscious coordination – between terrorism and counterterrorism. At the very least, the media and politicians who play the fear card actually empower terrorism and amplify its impact far beyond its objective capabilities to cause material harm. Moreover, as a consequence and as suggested by Goodin, all these actors share responsibility in the distinctive moral wrong that belongs to terrorism. In such a situation, there is an urgent need for immanent critique and deconstruction – what anthropologists would recognise as exorcism of the demonic power of the terrorism threat narrative (see Zulaika and Douglass, 1996).

#### <Their framing of terrorism as an Islamic action perpetuated against the United States ignores actions of terrorism against Muslims, like the actions of Breivik in Norway, which were a result of the cult of bipartisanship in our current politics. That’s 1AC Giroux>

#### Indefinite detention doesn’t solve –

#### Complicates local cooperation

Hathaway, et al, ‘13

[Oona (Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law, Yale Law School); Samuel Adelsberg (J.D. candidate at Yale Law School); Spencer Amdur (J.D. candidate at Yale Law School); Freya Pitts (J.D. candidate at Yale Law School); Philip Levitz (J.D. from Yale Law School); and Sirine Shebaya (J.D. from Yale Law School), “The Power To Detain: Detention of Terrorism Suspects After 9/11”, The Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 38, 2013, RSR]

Legitimacy of the trial process is important not only to the individuals charged but also to the fight against terrorism. As several successful habeas corpus petitions have demonstrated, insufficient procedural protections create a real danger of erroneous imprisonment for extend periods. 249 Such efforts can generate resentment and distrust of the United States that undermine the effectiveness of counterterrorism efforts. Indeed, evidence suggests that populations are more likely to cooperate in policing when they believe they have been treated fairly.250 The understanding that a more legitimate detention regime will be a more effective one is reflected in recent statements from the Department of Defense and the White House.251

#### Complicates allied intel cooperation

Pearlstein, Visiting Research Scholar and Lecturer in Public and International Affairs, Woodrow

Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, ‘9

[Deborah, “WE'RE ALL EXPERTS NOW:¶ A SECURITY CASE AGAINST SECURITY DETENTION”, Case Western Journal of International Law, Vol. 40, 2009, RSR]

Particularly in the challenge of counterterrorism detention policy,¶ the United States has had to face the reality that programs it has pursued¶ principally for tactical purposes have resulted in significant strategic setbacks.¶ As one recent and striking poll of a bipartisan group of leading U.S.¶ foreign policy experts found, eighty-seven percent of experts polled believed¶ that features of the U.S. detention system had hurt more than helped¶ in the fight against Al Qaeda. 17 Indeed, detention programs have at times¶ resulted in significant tactical losses. Britain, America's close ally, pulled¶ out of planned joint counterterrorism operations with the CIA because it¶ could not obtain adequate assurances that U.S. agents would refrain from¶ rendition or cruel treatment.' 8 The costs of such trade-offs may be especially¶ acute in some circumstances-for example, if securing international cooperation¶ for the disposition of fissile material is central to a state's strategic¶ counterterrorism plan.

### Cap 2AC

#### Case outweighs – combating the racial narratives that the 1AC criticizes is a pre-requisite to fighting capitalism.

Roberts and Mahanti, Dpt. Of Geography and Planning Univ of Toronto, 2010

[David J. and Minel .1le- Neoliberalizing Race, Racing Neoliberalism: Placing “Race” in Neoliberal Discourse; a paper first presented in 2008 at the AAGs in Boston, MA in April; published online February 18th; ANTIPODE, Vol. 42, Issue 2; pp. 248-257, March. http://ccrri.ukzn.ac.za/archive/archive/files/neoliberalizing\_race,\_racing\_neoliberalism-\_placing\_race\_in\_neoliberal\_discourses\_\_8f9de33fa7.pdf]

As a consequence, neoliberalism effectively masks racism through its value-laden moral project: camouflaging practices anchored in an apparent meritocracy, making possible a utopic vision of society that is non-racialized. David Theo Goldberg’s articulation of racist culture is particularly useful in understanding how race is both evoked and suppressed under neoliberal discourse. Goldberg’s project in Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning is to “map the overlapping terrains of racialized expression, their means and modes of discursive articulation, and the exclusions they license with the view to contending and countering them.” (Goldberg 1993: 9) His central thesis is that modern racist culture is marked, fundamentally, by its refusal to acknowledge the role that racism plays in everyday structures of society and how these structures work to fundamentally disguise and, simultaneously, reify the power of racism within society. He intricately describes the ways liberalism sanctions racist institutions and reproduces racial knowledge with every outwardly progressive gesture, which works to normalize racism as just an aspect of life. Along similar lines, Henry Giroux insists that the meanings, definitions and challenges of racism alter each generation, and that the challenge for scholars is to develop a new language forunderstanding how race redefines the relationship between the public and the private (Giroux 2008). Giroux points out that race, and in particular, long histories of racism and injustice are effectively eradicated within neoliberal discourse because human agency is understood as a series of individualized choices: “success is attributed to…entrepreneurial genius while those who do not succeed are viewed either as failures or utterly expendable…neoliberal racism either dismisses the concept of institutional racism or maintains that it has no merit” (Giroux 2008: 65 and 71). Thus, in trying to understand the connection between race and neoliberalism, we recommend that it is important to examine not just the momentary eruptions of race or racism that seemingly result from neoliberal policy reforms, and instead consider race as an organizing principle of society that neoliberalism reinforces and modifies. As Giroux reminds us, “even more than being saturated with race, neoliberalism also modifies race (Giroux 2005).” (Davis 2007: 349) Neoliberalism policy is sneaky because it can force the hand of apparent raceblindness by insisting that race does not play an important role.

#### Perm: do both. A focus on the public is key – Islamophobic rhetoric becomes a trope to justify wars that sustain the military-industrial complex, because it always needs an external threat like Islam to exist. That’s 1AC Bryan.

#### Alternative recreates capitalism – without a focus on western epistemology, secular focus becomes Protestant, which justifies the Protestant work ethic where work becomes our new religion. Their alternative is just a Western neoliberal ploy to keep the working class down.

#### Can’t solve racial profiling – which affects Muslims of all classes.

#### Analysis of power relations solely through economic structures is ethnocentric, and only re-inscribes economic dependency in lieu of third world agency

Kapoor, 2008

[Ilan, Associate Professor at the Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University, “The Postcolonial Politics of Development,” p. 10-11]

From the postcolonial standpoint, **dependency ignores** (for the most part) **culture and the politics of representation**. Frank gives them no place in his analysis, and Cardoso and Faletto, while including ideology (e.g. nationalism, populism) and sociocultural groups in their dialectical approach, tend to treat these as super- structural or epiphenomenal. **That is, culture is a factor, but it is viewed only in relation to the political economy**. It matters only to the extent that it helps or hinders dependent development. Thus, **they look at it as** one element among many, and more precisely as **a subordinate element**, in their politics.7 They do not examine the politics of (and within) culture, **and are unaware of the way in which culture frames their very own analysis.** Indeed, their (and Frank’s) neglect of the politics of representation results in ethnocentrism. From the point of view of the dependentistas, this neglect is unfortunate, given their intention precisely to look at imperialism from the perspective of the periph- ery (Blomström & Hettne 1984: 37); but from the point of view of postcolonial theorists, it is not unexpected, given their argument (noted above) that counter- discourses often reverse or perpetuate orientalist representations. **Such is the case with dependency’s construction of binary opposites — ‘developed–underdeveloped’, ‘centre–periphery’, ‘metropole–satellite**’ — which, although attempting to shift analytical focus to the second term, leave unexamined and untouched the power relationship between the two. The ‘centre’ continues to be just that — central and dominant — so that the West ends up being consolidated ‘as sovereign subject’ (Spivak 1985a: 247). Not surprisingly, many have argued that, despite intentions to the contrary, such a discursive hierarchy contributes to a psychology of perpet- ual dependence in the ‘periphery’, habituating colonized and ex-colonized subjects to being peripheralized (Fanon 1967; cf. James 1997: 207).

#### <No discourse tradeoff – discussing false representations that are used to shape foreign policy and the enforcement of indefinite detention is compatible with a criticism of class divisions – OR their alternative precludes discussions of flawed cultural representations which makes Islamophobia inevitable – puts them in a double bind>

#### Marxist reliance on macro-structural explanations for instances of racism are incomplete – the failure to understand racism as a cultural practice external to the modes of production makes their method ineffective and susceptible to Eurocentric thought

West 89 (Cornel West, Honorary Chair, Democratic Socialists of America, Toward a Socialist Theory of Racism, Democratic Socialists of America, 1989, http://www.chicagodsa.org/CornelWest.html, da 12-27-13) PC

A new analysis of racism builds on the best of Marxist theory (particularly Antonio Gramsci's focus on the cultural and ideological spheres), and yet it goes beyond by incorporating three key assumptions:¶ 1. Cultural practices, including racist discourses and actions, have multiple power functions (such as domination over non-Europeans) that are neither reducible to nor intelligible in terms of class exploitation alone. In short these practices have a reality of their own and cannot simply be reduced to an economic base.¶ 2. Cultural practices are the medium through which selves are produced. We are who and what we are owing primarily to cultural practices. The complex process of people shaping and being shaped by cultural practices involves the use of language, psychological factors, sexual identities, and aesthetic conceptions that cannot be adequately grasped by a social theory primarily focused on modes of production at the macrostructural level.¶ 3. Cultural practices are not simply circumscribed by modes of production; they also are bounded by civilizations. Hence, cultural practices cut across modes of production. (For example, there are forms of Christianity that exist in both precapitalist and capitalist societies.) An analysis of racist practices in both premodern and modern Western civilization yields both continuity and discontinuity. Even Marxism can be shown to be both critical of and captive to a Eurocentrism that can justify racist practices. Although Marxist theory remains indispensable, it obscures the manner in which cultural practices, including notions of "scientific" rationality, are linked to particular ways of life.

#### Can’t explain instances of Islamophobia like the Crusades – there’s little materialist incentive to occupy Jerusalem because of its lack of resources.

#### <Cross apply the> Rationality DA – Historical materialism relies on universal rationality, where truth-seeking is a process separate from their social conditions. That’s 1AC Asad. Historical materialism is a reaction to the Enlightenment’s deployment of religion – defining religion as an opiate of the masses meant to prop up Capitalism, which justified Islamophobic policies like the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the name of class struggle.

#### Total rejection of capitalism fragments resistance

Gibson-Graham, prof of human geography @ Australian National University, 96

(J.K. Gibson-Graham, Professor of Human Geography at the Australian National University and Professor of Geosciences at the University of Massachusates, Amherst, 1996 (The End of Capitalism (As We Know It))

One of our goals as Marxists has been to produce a knowledge of capitalism. Yet as “that which is known,” Capitalism has become the intimate enemy. We have uncloaked the ideologically-clothed, obscure monster, but we have installed a naked and visible monster in its place. In return for our labors of creation, the monster has robbed us of all force. We hear – and find it easy to believe – that the left is in disarray. Part of what produces the disarray of the left is the vision of what the left is arrayed against. When capitalism is represented as a unified system coextensive with the nation or even the world, when it is portrayed as crowding out all other economic forms, when it is allowed to define entire societies, it becomes something that can only be defeated and replaced by a mass collective movement (or by a process of systemic dissolution that such a movement might assist). The revolutionary task of replacing capitalism now seems outmoded and unrealistic, yet we do not seem to have an alternative conception of class transformation to take its place. The old political economic “systems” and “structures” that call forth a vision of revolution as systemic replacement still seem to be dominant in the Marxist political imagination. The New World Order is often represented as political fragmentation founded upon economic unification. In this vision the economy appears as the last stronghold of unity and singularity in a world of diversity and plurality. But why can’t the economy be fragmented too? If we theorized it as fragmented in the United States, we could being to see a huge state sector (incorporating a variety of forms of appropriation of surplus labor), a very large sector of self-employed and family-based producers (most noncapitalist), a huge household sector (again, quite various in terms of forms of exploitation, with some households moving towards communal or collective appropriation and others operating in a traditional mode in which one adult appropriates surplus labor from another). None of these things is easy to see. If capitalism takes up the available social space, there’s no room for anything else. If capitalism cannot coexist, there’s no possibility of anything else. If capitalism functions as a unity, it cannot be partially or locally replaced. My intent is to help create the discursive conception under which socialist or other noncapitalist construction becomes “realistic” present activity rather than a ludicrous or utopian goal. To achieve this I must smash Capitalism and see it in a thousand pieces. I must make its unity a fantasy, visible as a denial of diversity and change.

#### Capitalism is inevitable

Hudson 99(member of the Progressive Librarians Guild and the American Library Association’s Social Responsibilities Round Table, 1999 (Mark, Fall, “Understanding Information Media in the Age of Neoliberalism: The Contributions of Herbert Schiller,” The Progressive Librarian, Issue: 16, JS)

Neoliberal ideas are as old as capitalism itself, but in recent decades they have seen a tremendous resurgence and have displaced the state-interventionist economic theories of the interwar and post-World War II periods to become the reigning ideology of our time. Neoliberalism emerged full force in the 1980s with the right-wing Reagan and Thatcher regimes, but its influence has since spread across the political spectrum to encompass not only centrist political parties but even much of the traditional social-democratic left. In the 1990s, neoliberal hegemony over our politics and culture has become so overwhelming that it is becoming difficult to even rationally discuss what neoliberalism is; indeed, as Robert McChesney notes, the term "neoliberalism" is hardly known to the U.S. public outside of academia and the business community (McChesney). The corporate stranglehold on our information and communications media gives neoliberal ideologues a virtually unchallenged platform from which to blast their pro-market messages into every corner of our common culture. At the same time, neoliberalism provides the ideological cover for deregulatory legislation (most recently the 1996 Telecommunications Act) that enables corporations to extend their monopoly over these media even more. For the past three decades, one of the fiercest and most coherent critics of corporate control over the information/communications sphere has been the social scientist Herbert Schiller. Although Schiller began his career before neoliberalism's ascendance, and he does not even today use the term in his writings, his work provides essential insights into the roots of neoliberal/corporate hegemony over our information media and the adverse consequences of that hegemony for our politics, economy and culture.

#### Materialism’s essentialist explanations for Islamophobia are Euro-centric – it’s an instance of epistemic racism that allows so-called ‘experts’ to decide what’s best for Muslim people while excluding inter-cultural dialogue, making racist policies inevitable. That’s 1AC Grosfoguel and Mielants.

#### Ethnicity is a better intersectional explanation that they cannot access – Religion and culture are a dimension of ethnicity – their scholarship reduces this to a function of class, which leaves out the ways that we give meaning to our lives psychologically, for example turning away from material desires.

#### Islamophobia is a psychological issue that doesn’t just come from the means of production – people only come to know themselves by defining themselves against other people – that’s 1AC Bryan.

#### Our cultural analysis offers a better historical account for why Islamophobia occurs – localized instances of Islamophobia over time reveal that culture, not class, is the best starting point.

Grosfoguel and Mielants 6 (Ramón Grosfoguel, University of California - Berkeley, and Eric Mielants, Fairfield University, The Long-Durée Entanglement Between Islamophobia and Racism in the Modern/Colonial Capitalist/Patriarchal World-System: An Introduction, Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge: Vol. 5:Iss. 1, Article 2., 23 September 2006, http://scholarworks.umb.edu/humanarchitecture/vol5/iss1/2, da 10-12-13) PC

In the last 60 years there has been a historical transformation in racist discourses. While biological racist discourses declined, cultural racism became the hegemonic form of racism in the late world-system (Grosfoguel 2003). The defeat of Nazi Germany, the anti-colonial struggles and the civil rights movements of colonial minorities inside the Western empires created the historical and political conditions for the transition from biological racism to cultural racism. The white elites of the world-system did not give up on their racism. They simply shifted the meanings and discourses of “race” in response to the challenges from the struggles of colonized people.¶ Cultural racism is a form of racism that does not even mention the word “race.” It is focused on the cultural inferiority of a group of people. Usually it is framed in terms of the inferior habits, beliefs, behaviors, or values of a group of people. It is close to biological racism in the sense that cultural racism naturalizes/essentializes the culture of the racialized/inferiorized people. The latter are often represented as fixed in a timeless space.¶ In the new cultural racist discourses, religion has a dominant role. The contemporary tropes about “uncivilized,” “barbarian,” “savage,” “primitive,” “underdeveloped,” “authoritarian,” and “terrorist” inferior people are today concentrated in the “other’s” religious practices and beliefs. By focusing on the “other’s” religion, the Europeans, Euro-Americans and Euro-Israelis manage to escape being accused of racism. However, when we carefully examine the hegemonic rhetoric in place, the tropes are a repetition of old biological racist discourses and the people who are the target of Islamophobic discourses are the traditional colonial subjects of the Western Empires, that is, the “usual suspects.”¶ Only within the outlined long durée of historical continuities together with the recent hegemony of cultural racism can we understand the relationship between Islamophobia and racism today. It is absolutely impossible to de-link the hate or fear against Muslims from racism against non-European people. Islamophobia and cultural racism are entangled and overlapping discourses. The association of Muslims with the colonial subjects of Western empires in the minds of white populations is simply a given in the core of the “modern/colonial capitalist/patriarchal world-system.” This links Islamophobia to an old colonial racism that is still alive in the world today, especially in the metropolitan centers.¶ In Great Britain, Muslims are associated with Egyptians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis (subjects from old British colonies); thus Islamophobia in Britain is associated with anti-Black, anti-Arab and anti-South Asian racism. In France, Muslims are mostly North Africans (from old colonies such as Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Senegal, etc.). In The Netherlands, Muslims are mostly ‘guest¶ workers’ and colonial migrants coming from Turkey, Morocco, Indonesia and Suriname so Islamophobia in The Netherlands is associated with racism against guest worker migrants and old colonial subjects. In Belgium, 90% of the Belgian population uses the term ‘vreemdelingen’ or ‘étrangers’ (‘foreigners’) to refer specifically to Moroccan, Turkish or Arab immigrants, i.e., cultural others that can be defined as Muslims (Billiet & Carton & Huys 1990:432). In Germany, Islamophobia is associated with anti-Turk racism, and in Spain with anti-Moor racism. Thus Islamophobia as a fear or hatred of Muslims is associated with anti-Arab, anti-Asian, and anti-Black racism.¶ Similarly, in the United States, Islam is associated with African-Americans—most notably the Nation of Islam—and Arabs of all ethnicities. Puerto Ricans as colonial subjects of the U.S. empire are suspicious subjects in the Islamophobic hysteria1 and the fact that Latinos are one of the largest growing populations of converts to Islam in the U.S. is also an issue. After 9/11, many conservative politicians and American media outlets, such as commentator Lou Dobbs on CNN, associated illegal immigrants with terrorism and national security problems, encouraging, if not leading to, the increased militarization of the U.S.-Mexico border. The latter will likely only lead to more economic refugees dying in the desert.¶ It does not matter if the Western domestic political system is the British multicultural model or the French Republican model— neither is working. Unable to overcome the problem of racial discrimination, racism becomes a corrosive process that ends up destroying the abstract ideals of each model. In the case of the Anglo-American world, multiculturalism and diversity operate to conceal white supremacy. The racial minorities are allowed to celebrate their history, traditions and identity as long as they leave intact the white supremacy’s racial/ethnic hierarchy of the status quo. The dominant sys- tem in the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States is an institutionalized and concealed “white affirmative action” that benefits whites on a daily basis and at all levels of social existence. It is so powerful that it has become normalized to the point of not being stated as such.¶ In the French Republican model, the formal system of equality operates with an institutionalized and normalized “communautarisme masculin blanc.” If racial/gender/ sexual minorities protest discrimination, they are accused by the “communautaristes masculin blanc” in power to be acting as “communautaristes” as if the elites in power were racial and gender blind/neutral, be- having towards everybody with a “universal principle of equality.” White supremacy in France operates within the myth of a “racially blind society.” “Racially-blind racism” is institutionalized and normalized in France to the point that makes discriminatory “communautarisme masculin blanc” in- visible.¶ Islamophobia is a case in point. The so-called neutrality of the West is contradicted when Muslims affirm their practices and identities in the public sphere and when they make claims of discrimination in education or the labor market as citizens with equal rights within Western states. The veil law in France against Muslim women’s use of the veil in public institutions or the incarceration without due procedure and torture of thousands of Muslims in the United States are just recent instances in a long list of grievances.¶ At a world level, Islamophobia has been the dominant discourse used in the post-civil rights and post-independence era of dominant cultural racist discourses against Arabs. The events of 9/11 escalated anti-Arab racism through an Islamophobic hysteria all over the world, specifically among the dominant elites of the United States and Israel. The latter is not surprising given U.S. and Israeli representation of Palestinians, Arabs and Islamic people in general as terrorists decades before 9/11 (Said 1979, 1981). The responsibility of U.S. foreign policy is never linked to the tragic events of 9/11. The U.S. Cold War against the “Evil Empire” in Afghanistan during the 1980s financed, supported and created a global network of Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups, then known as “Freedom Fighters,” that came back to haunt them on 9/11 (Johnson 2006). The U.S. was complicit in Osama Bin-Laden’s and Al Qaeda’s operations as part of the CIA’s global/imperial designs and operations against the Soviet Union back in the 1980s. However, it is easier to blame Arab people and use racist Islamophobic arguments rather than to critically examine U.S. foreign policy over the past 50 years. The same applies to Saddam Hussein, who was a loyal U.S. ally and fought dirty wars, sup- ported by the CIA, against Iran following U.S. imperial/global designs during the 1980s. Yet he was later declared a U.S. enemy and falsely accused by the U.S. elites to have links to Al Qaeda in order to justify a long-planned war against Iraq (Risen 2006).¶ It is symptomatic that in most Western countries, Arabs are still perceived as if they were “the majority of Muslims in the world” even though they are only 1/5 of the world’s total Muslim population. This is related to Western global/imperial designs for domination and exploitation of oil in the Middle East and Arabs’ resistance against it (Harvey 2003). The long term exaggerated image of Arabs as terrorists and violent in Western media (newspapers, movies, radio, television, etc.) has been fundamental to the new wave of anti-Arab racism linked to an Islamophobic discourse through cultural racism before and after 9/11 (Said 1981). It is not accidental that Anti-Arab racism accounts for most Islamophobia in the West. Even Muslims from South Asia and African origin living in the West get part of the heat of the anti-Arab racism, especially in the United States (Salaita 2006).

#### Marxist thought’s exclusive focus on class to form a global proposal of communism is rooted in epistemic racism – that makes imperialism inevitable and justifies capitalism

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Karl Marx, writing in the mid-19th century, makes important modifications to this tradition of Western philosophical thought. I will limit myself here to the two types of universalism in discussion. Marx criticizes the Hegelian dialectic for its idealism and criticizes Feuerbach’s materialism for its mechanicism/reductionism, that is, for its lack of dialectic in the face of the human practice of transforming nature and oneself. For Marx, the Hegelian movement from the abstract to the concrete is not simply a movement of philosophical categories, but rather one of categories of political economy (see Grundrisse). Against Hegel, for Marx the determinations of political economy over the social life of humans gain primacy over conceptual determinations. Therefore, in Marx, the Hegelian elevation from the abstract to the concrete is understood as a movement of thought within the political-economic categories of his epoch. Although his definition of the abstract and the concrete is very similar to that of Hegel, in which the concrete is rich in multiple determinations, Marx differentiates himself from Hegel in the primacy that he grants to the categories of political economy and in positing a movement prior to the elevation from the abstract to the concrete which Hegel does not recognize. This is the movement from the concrete to the abstract; that is, from sensory perception and empirical reality situated within a moment in the history of the evolution of political economy and class struggle toward more abstract categories (see Marx, Grundrisse).¶ Just like Hegel, Marx historicizes these categories. However, that which serves as a starting point for Hegel, that is, the most abstract universal categories from which reality is deduced, becomes arrival points in Marx. In Marx’s materialist turn, the most abstract categories are those that are produced through a very complex historical-social process of thought. Therefore, for Marx, the movement of thought first moves from the concrete to the abstract in order to produce simple and abstract categories, only to then return from the abstract to the concrete to produce complex categories. Hegel saw the second movement (from the abstract to the concrete, from simple concepts to complex ones), but as a result of his idealism he was blind to the first movement (from the concrete to the abstract, from empty concepts to simpler ones). For example, the category of labor is a simple one that emerges in a particular moment of human history when labor is socially detached from its concrete multiplicity. In agreement with Marx, this only occurs in the capitalist¶ system when mercantile relations come to predominate in the social relations of production. Economic thought can only create this category as a simple and abstract concept at a determinate moment in the development of human history. Previously, to speak of labor one would refer to the concrete labor carried out by the person: shoemaker, seamstress, farmer, etc. It is only when these various tasks are measured socially according to their exchange value (the socially-necessary labor time for the production of a commodity), and not according to use value (the kind of qualitative labor involved in production), that the emergence of the category “labor” becomes socially possible as an abstract concept indifferent to particular concrete labor. That is to say, for Marx thought does not spring from the heads of people in a determinate moment of the development of Spirit as seems to be the case for Hegel, but emerges instead from the determinate, concrete, historico-social situation of the development of the political economy. So Marx epistemically situates the production of knowledge not as the result of the development of Spirit in an epoch, but rather of the material development of the relations of production and forces of production (“mode of production”).¶ This grounding of the history of Hegelian Spirit in the history of the political economy and its relation to the thought of an epoch is what causes Marx to give a materialist turn to the Hegelian dialectic. As a result, Marx would emphasize the class character of the political, theoretical, and philosophical perspective in question. The point of view of the proletariat would be for Marx the epistemological departure point for a critique of what he deemed bourgeois political economy. This represented an important rupture with the Western philosophical tradition with regard to these two types of universalism. In Type I, the universalism of utterances, Marx situated these utterances, as did Hegel, in their historical context. Against Hegel, this historical context was no longer that of Universal Spirit, but rather the development of the political economy, the mode of production, and the corresponding class struggle. The conditions of production assume primacy over consciousness in all historical eras, still an abstract universal utterance, but one in which the operation of the determination “in the last instance” of economic processes will vary in each epoch. We have here an abstract universal that is filled with the political-economic content of every historical epoch, thereby becoming concrete.¶ In Type II, the abstract epistemic universalism of the subject of enunciation, Marx situated the position from which subjects think in relation to classes and class struggle. Hence, against the tradition that spans from Descartes to Hegel, Marx situates his geopolitics of knowledge in relation to social classes. Marx thinks from the historico-social situation of the European proletariat, and it is on the basis of this perspective that he proposes a global/universal design as the solution to the problems of all humanity: communism. What Marx maintains in common with the Western Bourgeois philosophical tradition is that his universalism, despite having emerged from a particular location—in this case, the proletariat—does not problematize the fact that this subject is European, masculine, heterosexual, white, Judeo-Christian, etc. Marx’s proletariat is a conflictive subject internal to Europe, which does not allow him to think outside the Eurocentric limits of Western thought. Neither cosmological and epistemological diversality nor the multiplicity of sexual, gender, racial, and religious power relations are incorporated or epistemically situated within his thought.¶ Just like the Western thinkers that preceded him, Marx participates in the epistemic racism in¶ which there only exists a single epistemology with access to universality: the Western tradition. In Marx, in the epistemic universalism of the second type, the subject of enunciation remains concealed, camouflaged, hidden beneath a new abstract universal that is no longer “man,” “the transcendental subject,” “the ego,” but instead “the proletariat” and its universal political project, “communism.” Hence the 20th-century communist project was, albeit from the left, yet another Western global imperial/colonial design which under the Soviet empire attempted to export to the rest of the world its universal abstract of “communism” as “the solution” to global problems. Marx reproduces an epistemic racism much like that of Hegel, which does not allow him to grant to non- European peoples and societies either temporal coevalness or the capacity to produce thought worthy of being considered part of the philosophical legacy of humanity or world history. For Marx, non-European peoples and societies were primitive, backwards, that is, Europe’s past. They had not reached either the development of the forces of production or the levels of social evolution of European civilization. As a result, in the name of civilizing them and pulling them out of the ahistoric stagnation of pre-capitalist modes of production, Marx would support the British invasion of India in the 18th century and the United States’ invasion of Northern Mexico in the 19th century.¶ For Marx, the “Asiatic mode of production” was the Orientalist concept through which he characterized non-Western societies. This “Asiatic mode of production” was characterized by its incapability of change and transformation, that is, by its always infinite and eternal temporal reproduction. Marx participated in the linearity of time characteristic of Western evolutionist thought. Capitalism was a more advanced system and, following Eurocentered modernity’s rhetoric of salvation (Mignolo, Local Histories), it was better for the non-European peoples to accelerate their evolutionary process toward capitalism through imperial invasions than to continue their stagnation in antiquated forms of social production. This economicist evolutionism would lead 20th-century Marxists down a blind alley. Marxist thought, despite being from the left, ended up trapped in the same problems of Eurocentrism and colonialism that had imprisoned Eurocentered thinkers of the right.¶ At this point, I want to highlight two crucial points: 1- Any cosmopolitanism or global proposal that is constructed through the abstract¶ universalism of the second type, that is, through the epistemological universalism of the ego- politics of knowledge, will not be able to avoid becoming another global imperial/colonial design. If universal truth is constructed through the epistemology of a particular territory or body (whether it be Western, Christian, or Islamic), and through the exclusion of others, then the cosmopolitanism or global proposal that is constructed through this abstract universalist epistemology will be inherently imperialist/colonial.¶ 2- Abstract epistemic universalism in the modern/colonial Western philosophical tradition forms an intrinsic part of epistemological racism. Another way of saying this is: epistemic racism is inherent to modern Western philosophy. If universal reason and truth can only emerge through a white-European-masculine-heterosexual subject, and if the only tradition of thought with this capacity for universality and with access to truth is the Western tradition (inferiorizing all non-Western knowledge), then there can be no abstract universalism¶ without epistemic racism. Epistemological racism is intrinsic to a Western “abstract¶ universalism” which conceals who speaks and from where they speak. So the question is: How can we escape the dilemma between isolated provincial particularisms and abstract universalisms camouflaged as “cosmopolitan,” but equally provincial? How can we decolonize Western universalism?

#### Their method re-entrenches Capitalism – The rational causality of history is integral to capitalism’s relations of guilty which structure the law and economy, debt is established as guilt and the law functions to enforce it on the population

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If the task of a critique of history can only be satisfied by a critique of guilt history, then the privileged object of this critique must be Christianity as the religion of guilt economy, and capitalism as the system of a deterministic debt religion. By specifying these objects, some indication is given as to the place and the weight of Benjamin’s fragment “Capitalism as Religion” within the vast project of his theory of history and politics. The point of the diagnosis given in the formula “Capitalism as Religion” can be highlighted in contrast with Max Weber’s works on the sociology of religion— particularly, as might be supposed, with the works collected under the title The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Benjamin writes: “In capitalism a religion may be discerned—that is to say, capitalism serves essentially to allay the same worries, torments and restlessness to which the so-called religions used to provide answers. The proof of the religious structure of capitalism—not only, as Weber believes, as a formation conditioned by religion, but as an essentially religious phenomenon—would still lead us, even today, astray into an immeasurable universal polemic” [GS 6: 100]. Weber performed his studies according to the methodological principle of causality, and thus he characterized the rational ethics of ascetic Protestantism as the precondition for the modern—capitalist—business ethos of occidental societies: “The conditioning of the genesis of a ‘business mentality’ [. . .] by the content of certain religious beliefs represents,” as he says, “a causal relation” [DpE 21]. And thus capitalism’s genesis follows, though Weber does not say it, precisely the same kind of rationality—a logic of provenance and guilt—that supposedly first acquires its privileged modern status in the rise of the “business mentality” that Weber describes. The methodological apparatus applied to the spirit of capitalism is that of rational causality itself—and is thus structurally capitalistic in its inspiration. This method cannot therefore provide any means of liberation from capitalism and its structures. The fact that Weber incorporates a supplemental reverse causality in his analysis (turning Protestant Christianity into a result of the capitalist economic form) changes nothing in the specific form of his derivation.3 No matter where the series of causation starts—and no matter how it is additionally legitimated—it secures the economic form on the one side and the religious form on the other as fixed positions within a system of dependencies. Weber thus insists upon the derivation of economy and religion from one another, but does not take into account the possibility that both might refer themselves to a third sphere that does not represent their condition—as aítion or causa—but rather presents the space of their articulation. Benjamin avoids this methodological aporia and the theoretical as well as political futility of Weber’s interpretation by defining both capitalism and Protestant religiosity in the same terms. Both are relatively independent structures of relation with an identical function: namely that of providing an answer to “worries, torments and restlessness.” In this characterization, Benjamin is careful to speak of “the religious structure” and of “an essentially religious phenomenon,” without basing this structure on anything other than the conventional concept of religion, that of the “so-called” religions. It is not his own concept of religion (a rigorous one undoubtedly relying on Cohen and the tradition of Judaism) that underlies the notion of capitalism as an “essentially religious phenomenon.” “Fate and Character” is unambiguous on this: “An order, however, whose constitutive concepts are misfortune and guilt, and within which there is no thinkable course of liberation [. . .]—such an order cannot be religious” [GS 2.1.174]. The “capitalist religion” is therefore not a religion, but rather a “cult-religion,” a structure of belief and behavior, of law and economy, pursuing, like every other cult within the context of myth, the sole aim of organizing “the guilt- and debt-nexus of the living.” As religious, cultic, and cultural structures had done previously, the rules of conduct under capitalism give an answer to what Benjamin calls “worries, torments and restlessness”—they systematize a deficit without permitting any escape from it. The function of capitalism consists in structuring the lack by explaining its provenance and by giving instructions for its remediation. Capitalism is thus essentially etiology, the attribution of provenance and guilt. And more precisely, it is the positing of guilt, aetiotaxy. Like all “so-called religions,” capitalism follows a logic that Benjamin has made explicit in a sentence from “Fate and Character.” Though this sentence speaks of law and of legal decrees, it is valid (since law for Benjamin is an institution of myth) for all of the components of myth and its corresponding rites: “The law does not sentence to punishment but to guilt” [GS 2.1.175]. Thus it may correspondingly be said of all ritual and cultic practices, and particularly of capitalism as a cult religion: they condemn to guilt by positing guilt as the reason for a lack—for the “worries, torments and restlessness” of natural life—and condemn to punishment in order to make good on this debt and simultaneously perpetuate it. Capitalism is a system for the attribution of guilt as well as debt, just as all pagan cult religions that precede it, and just as Christianity that goes along and identifies with it. The religious function of capitalism, of the positing and maintaining of reasons, of the attribution of guilt and cause—of aetiotaxy—is not contradicted by the fact that the development of capitalism mostly relied upon another religious system for its form. Benjamin notes: “Capitalism has developed as a parasite of Christianity in the occidental countries (this must be shown not just in the case of Calvinism, but in the other orthodox Christian churches as well), until it reached a point where the history of Christianity became essentially that of its parasite—that is to say, of capitalism” [GS 6: 102]. Christianity would not have been able to transform itself into capitalism if capitalism had not been essentially Christian—“essentially religious,” and, as “cult religion” and guilt religion, intent on filling up a lack. That which is Christian in capitalism, and that which is capitalist in Christianity, is its parasitic relation to guilt. Thus Benjamin’s summation: “The Christianity of the Reformation did not favor the growth of capitalism; instead it transformed itself into capitalism” [GS 6: 102]. This transformation of Christianity into capitalism, from religious form into economic form, can only have come about in such a way that the form of the one remained preserved in the form of the other. For both are “essentially religious” forms, aetiotaxies, guilt forms positing the cause of a deficit.